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*
 
International institutions like the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) face significant hurdles that can pre-
vent them from establishing their legitimacy with far-
away audiences.  The hurdles become almost insur-
mountable when the ICC intervenes over the govern-
ment’s objection.  This Article explores various fac-
tors that may influence the perceived legitimacy of 
international tribunals.  It concludes that because the 
ICC faces access and communication disadvantages 
vis-à-vis state leaders, the ICC’s road to achieving 
domestic perception legitimacy will be a difficult one.  
Without significant and pervasive in-person outreach, 
the ICC will probably not be able to overcome any 
propaganda campaign government leaders wage 
against it to protect themselves and their cohort from 
being held accountable to the victims of violence.  Yet 
the literature identifies in-person outreach as the best 
way to promote a far-removed audience’s awareness 
and understanding of an international court’s opera-
tions and processes, especially because those audi-
ences are likely socialized to distrust judicial institu-
tions.  Even with access, the ICC still must overcome 
cross-cultural communication barriers.  State leaders, 
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by contrast, share in-group status with their citizenry.  
A case study of Kenya, using both documentary and 
interview evidence, illustrates the ICC’s domestic per-
ception legitimacy challenge.  After the ICC brought 
charges against them for committing crimes against 
humanity, Kenyan leaders fought back, besieging the 
public with rhetoric that painted the ICC as biased 
against Africa and a tool of colonialism. Enough Ken-
yans were apparently persuaded by the rhetoric that 
they backed leaders charged by the ICC with serious 
international crimes instead of supporting the ICC’s 
efforts to provide justice for Kenya’s victims.  To 
avoid such a situation in the future, states and other 
stakeholders need to help spread and advance the 
ICC’s embodied norms of justice and accountability 
so that those norms are internalized by domestic audi-
ences.  This path to achieving domestic perception le-
gitimacy will take time, but the payoff is that the ICC 
might be able to fulfill its goals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When States voted to create the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) at the Rome Conference in 1998,
1
 the overall sentiment was 
one of euphoria and hope.  Conference attendees applauded the 
Court’s creation, expressing the belief that this new permanent world 
court would transform international criminal law and ensure that per-
petrators of mass atrocities could no longer escape justice.
2
  The 
same sentiment prevailed when the Court became a reality in 2002.
3
  
At that time, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan opined 
that by creating the Court, States had “dealt a decisive blow” to im-
punity.
4
  At the first meeting of the Assembly of States Parties to the 
ICC in 2002, William Pace of the Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court
5
 argued that the “entry into force of the new system 
of international criminal justice represents a truly great victory for the 
protection of universal human rights and the advancement of human 
security.”6  The treaty creating the ICC, the Rome Statute, reflects 
these high hopes.  According to the Preamble, a primary goal of the 
 
 1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
38544 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 2. See John Washburn, The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court and International Lawmaking in the 21st Century, 11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 
361, 361–362 (1999) (stating that upon the favorable vote for the Rome Statute, diplomats 
abandoned themselves to a celebration in recognition of the future transformation of the ap-
plication and enforcement of international criminal law).  Not all States or commentators 
shared this euphoria and hopefulness about the ICC’s ability to so profoundly change the 
landscape of international justice.  See, e.g., James F. Alexander, The International Criminal 
Court and the Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2009) (quoting former U.S. Secretary of State John Bolton, who said that the ICC would 
have no deterrent effect on men like Pol Pot and that giving victims of atrocities hope of ICC 
deterrence amounts to a cruel joke). 
 3. The ICC came into existence in July 2002 after the required 60 states ratified the 
Rome Statute.  See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (3d ed. 2007).   
 4. Press Release, Office of the Secretary-General, Transcript of Press Conference 
with President Carlo Ciampi of Italy and Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Rome and New 
York by Video Conference, U.N. Press Release SC/SM/8194 (Apr. 11, 2002).   
 5. The Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) is a network of NGOs 
that advocated for the ICC’s creation and that continues to advocate for all states to join the 
court.  See THE COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT. (CICC), http://www.coalition 
fortheicc.org/ [https://perma.cc/E3S5-FSLW]. 
 6. William R. Pace, Convenor, Coalition for the Int’l Crim. Ct., Statement of the Coa-
lition for the International Criminal Court to the First Assembly of States Parties to the In-
ternational Criminal Court (Sept. 9, 2002), http://archive.iccnow.org/documents 
/ciccASP9Sept02.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZF2-2QQK]. 
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Court is to end impunity for perpetrators of the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community.
7
 
Since the ICC began operating, much scholarly literature has 
engaged with the question of whether and under what circumstances 
the ICC can achieve its lofty goals.  Critics have identified a variety 
of structural limitations on the Court’s ability to transform interna-
tional justice.
8
  Most notably, the Court lacks the direct coercive 
power that facilitates the operation of domestic criminal courts.  The 
Court has no police force to arrest perpetrators
9
 and relies on State 
cooperation to gather evidence and to bring suspects to the court-
room.
10
  Though the Rome Statute requires its States Parties to com-
ply with requests to provide evidence,
11
 arrest suspects, and surrender 
suspects,
12
 the ICC cannot coerce compliance.  At most, the ICC can 
find that a State failed to cooperate and refer the matter to external 
bodies.
13
 
Despite these limitations, the ICC has made some strides in 
ending impunity for serious international crimes.  As of October 
2017, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has brought charges 
against individuals in twenty-five cases based on ten situations.
14
  
The ICC has convicted four perpetrators.
15
  In addition, the ICC has 
 
 7. Rome Statute, supra note 1, Preamble.  
 8. Though not a focus of this Article, the Court’s limited prosecutorial and financial 
resources permit the processing of only a handful of cases each year.  See, Christopher W. 
Mullins & Dawn L. Rothe, The Ability of the International Criminal Court to Deter Viola-
tions of International Criminal Law:  A Theoretical Assessment, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 771, 
780 (2010) (explaining how the court’s budget constrains its ability to open investigations 
and try cases). 
 9. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Steven D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 132 
DAEDALUS 47, 55 (2003) (referencing the ICC’s lack of a police force as one reason why it 
is “wishful thinking” that the ICC will “save many lives” in the future).  
 10. See, e.g., How the Court Works, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works/Pages/default.aspx#legalProcess (last visited Nov. 5, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/3Z7N-VW4W] (stating that the ICC has no police force and must 
rely on state cooperation). The ICC does not permit trials in absentia except in “exceptional 
circumstances” in which the accused, while before the Court, repeatedly disrupts proceed-
ings; Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 63.  
 11. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 86.  
 12. Id. art. 89. 
 13. Id. art. 87(7). 
 14. Some cases have more than one suspect.  In total, 41 people have been indicted by 
the ICC.  See Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9RMY-H24X]. 
 15. See, Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC Trial Chamber VIII declares Mr. Al Mahdi 
Guilty of the War Crime of Attacking Historic and Religious Buildings in Timbuktu and 
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used its resources to develop domestic rule of law and encourage 
States to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes in their do-
mestic courts.
16
 
It is apparent, however, that the ICC’s lack of coercive power 
has negatively impacted its ability to carry out its functions and 
achieve its goals; the ICC has suffered several defeats directly linked 
to State non-cooperation.  One notable example is five separate 
States failing to arrest and surrender President al-Bashir of Sudan af-
ter the 2009 issuance of his warrant for arrest.
17
  To date, the warrant 
remains unexecuted. Kenya, Chad, South Africa, Djibouti, and 
Uganda welcomed al-Bashir to their countries and allowed him to re-
turn to Sudan.
18
 
 
Sentences Him to Nine Years’ Imprisonment (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1242 [https://perma.cc/636D-3DSP] (referencing the con-
viction of Al Mahdi); Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Sentenced to 14 
Years of Imprisonment (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr824.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/99MT-7D3N] (referencing the conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo); 
Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Germaine Katanga Sentenced to 12 Years’ Imprisonment 
(May 23, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media 
/press%20releases/Pages/pr1008.aspx [https://perma.cc/J875-VVK3] (referencing the con-
viction of Germaine Katanga); Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC Trial Chamber III declares 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity (Mar. 21, 
2016),  https://www.icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=pr1200 [https://perma.cc/EJ26-
7WCH] (regarding the conviction of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo).  Though the Court has 
convicted Bemba, Bemba is currently appealing the conviction.  See, Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Public Redacted Version of Appellant’s 
Document in Support of the Appeal (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_08242.PDF [https://perma.cc/765Z-NHFJ] 
 16. Kirsten Ainley, The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal 
Court: Counteracting the Crisis, 91 INT’L AFF. 37, 48–49 (2015) (stating that the ICC “put 
pressure on the Colombian government to reform its domestic legal system” and promoted 
domestic proceedings by contacting independent experts and meeting with Colombian offi-
cials, judges, prosecutors, NGOs, and victims);  see also Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor, 
Office of ICC Prosecutor, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the conclusion 
of the peace negotiations between the Government of Colombia and the Rovolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=160901-otp-stat-colombia [https://perma.cc/NG5B-
4VXD] (statement from the ICC Prosecutor about how she “supported Colombia's efforts to 
bring an end to the decades-long armed conflict in line with its obligations under the Rome 
Statute since the beginning of the [peace] negotiations” and “will continue to do so during 
the implementation phase”). 
 17. Situation in Darfur, Sudan, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 
Case Information Sheet, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur 
/albashir/Documents/AlBashirEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/PKR2-MTA7]. 
 18. See, e.g., Peter Leftie & Kevin Kelly, Storm Over al-Bashir’s Surprise Visit, DAILY 
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How can an international court achieve compliance with its 
orders when it lacks power to coerce?  This Article looks to the lit-
erature on institutional legitimacy to suggest an answer:  the ICC 
needs to build its stock of domestic perception legitimacy, particular-
ly in cases when it intervenes over the State’s objection.  Domestic 
perception legitimacy reflects the beliefs of the individuals and 
communities directly affected by the atrocities investigated by an in-
ternational tribunal.
19
  When levels of domestic perception legitimacy 
are high, individuals tend to comply, and push others to comply, with 
institutional orders because they view the norms advanced by the in-
stitution as their own.
20
  With the domestic audience on its side, the 
ICC would be better positioned to pressure State leaders to comply 
with their Rome Statute obligations.  The corollary is also true:  un-
less the ICC can convince domestic audiences of its legitimacy, those 
audiences are unlikely to support the Court and push leaders to adopt 
and adhere to norms of international criminal justice and accountabil-
ity.
21
 
This Article’s focus is on underscoring the importance of do-
mestic perception legitimacy when the ICC intervenes over the 
State’s objection—as it did in Kenya when the ICC’s OTP brought 
 
NATION (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.nation.co.ke/Kenya%20Referendum 
/Storm%20over%20al%20Bashir%20/-/926046/998960/-/69nwjj/-/ [https://perma.cc/F6EP-
H9R5] (discussing Bashir’s 2010 visit to Kenya);  Xan Rice, Chad Refuses to Arrest Omar 
al-Bashir on Genocide Charges GUARDIAN (July 22, 2010), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/22/chad-refuses-arrest-omar-al-bashir 
[https://perma.cc/N2DN-M3B8] (discussing Bashir’s 2010 visit to Chad);  ICC refers Ugan-
da and Djibouti to UN for not arresting al-Bashir, DW (July 12, 2016), 
http://www.dw.com/en/icc-refers-uganda-and-djibouti-to-un-for-not-arresting-al-bashir/a-
19396326 [https://perma.cc/AUV7-VRHT] (discussing Bashir’s visits to South Africa, 
Uganda, and Djibouti). 
 19. Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of Interna-
tional Criminal Courts:  Implications for the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 45 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 405, 406 n. 1, 407 (2012).  Ford also explains that domestic per-
ceived legitimacy is not the only perceived legitimacy that is important to the functioning of 
an international criminal tribunal.  For the purposes of receiving funding and other support 
from the international community, the ICC will also want to achieve international perceived 
legitimacy. Id. at 407 n.1.  This Article addresses only the challenges the court faces in 
achieving domestic perceived legitimacy. 
 20. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Gov-
ernance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 495, 411 (2006); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological 
Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 376–79 (2006). 
 21. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice:  A Pluralist 
Process Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 12–13 (2010) (explaining that sociological legiti-
macy—referred to here as domestic perception legitimacy—influences the decision calculus 
of actors regarding compliance). 
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crimes against humanity charges against six high-profile Kenyans in 
2010.
22
  This Article does not discuss instances in which a State itself 
has sought the ICC’s assistance.23  If a State refers a case, it presum-
ably is prepared to cooperate with the Court, providing it access to 
the general populace, witnesses, and documentary evidence; the ICC 
does not need the public to mobilize and demand government coop-
eration.
24
  In contrast, when the ICC brings a case over a State’s ob-
jection, domestic mobilization may be a critical factor in whether the 
government will cooperate with the ICC’s efforts. 
There are, in theory, ways that the ICC can build its stock of 
domestic perception legitimacy, encourage the public to embrace ra-
ther than distrust
25
 the Court, and induce bottom-up compliance.  
Chief among them is ensuring that the public is aware of the ICC, its 
functions, and its goals.  Though the ICC devotes some resources to 
in-person outreach—the gold standard for educating a far-away pub-
lic—hostile State leaders may, in practice, interfere with ICC person-
nel’s access to the public.  Similarly, the Court’s civil society surro-
gates may face State-imposed obstacles or retribution.  Hostile State 
leaders can use their access and communication
26
 advantages to de-
 
 22. See Press Release, Int'l Crim. Ct., Kenya’s Post Election Violence:  ICC Prosecutor 
Presents Cases Against Six Individuals for Crimes Against Humanity (Dec.15, 2010), 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20(2010
)/Pages/pr615.aspx [https://perma.cc/C2VJ-HCP9];  Anthony Kariuki & Oliver Mathenge, 
Ocampo Names Kenya Chaos Suspects, DAILY NATION (Dec. 15, 2010), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Ocampo%20names%20Kenya%20chaos%20suspects
/-/1064/1072864/-/15awvwuz/-/index.html [https://perma.cc/X3GU-E3ZX]. 
 23. The Rome Statute does not expressly provide for self-referrals.  Indeed, its drafters 
did not anticipate that States would readily surrender their national criminal jurisdiction the 
Court.  Self-referral, which “promised better results in the form of enhanced state coopera-
tion,” was developed at the behest of the first ICC Prosecutor and through the ICC’s early 
practice.  The Ugandan government delivered the ICC its first self-referred situation.  De-
spite the potential for enhanced State cooperation, some have cast doubt on the prudence of 
relying heavily on self-referral.  See Andreas Muller & Ignaz Stegmiller, Self-Referrals on 
Trial:  From Panacea to Patient, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1267, 1269 (2010).  
 24. But see id. at 1286 (noting that enhanced cooperation “cannot be taken for granted” 
in self-referred cases because a State’s viewpoint of a situation may change over time). 
 25. See Victor Peskin, Courting Rwanda: The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Out-
reach Programme, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 950, 953 (2005) (arguing that unlike long-established 
courts that enjoy broad legitimacy, domestic audiences where crimes occurred will often 
view international criminal courts as alien because of “their perceived challenge to state sov-
ereignty, domestic conceptions of justice and the belief of a government or society in its own 
innocence”).  
 26. State leaders, unlike foreign ICC personnel, would not face the difficulties of cross-
cultural communication. See, e.g., Hillary Anger Elfenbein & Nalini Ambady, Universals 
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fine and impugn the Court.  A public inundated with, and persuaded 
by, negative rhetoric will not support the ICC’s efforts to advance in-
ternational criminal justice and accountability.  What can be done to 
avoid this unhappy outcome? 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I provides some back-
ground on the creation of the ICC, its goals, and its institutional 
structure.  Part I then explains why domestic perception legitimacy is 
essential to the ICC’s ability to deliver justice and accountability 
when the ICC intervenes over a State’s objection.  Part II explores 
various factors that may influence the perceived legitimacy of inter-
national tribunals and considers those factors in the context of ICC 
intervention over a State’s objection.  Part III uses Kenya as a case 
study to illustrate the challenges of building domestic perception le-
gitimacy.  Drawing from ICC documents, news reports, and inter-
views conducted by the Author, this Article demonstrates how Ken-
yan leaders used their access and communication advantages to wage 
a disinformation campaign against the ICC.  A sufficent number of 
Kenyans were persuaded by the campaign and backed their leaders 
instead of supporting the ICC’s efforts to provide justice for victims 
of atrocities. 
This Article concludes that the ICC likely will not be able to 
build domestic perception legitimacy without a concerted effort by 
the funding States Parties, the ICC itself, and civil society organiza-
tions.  With enough time and effort, these actors can advance the 
ICC’s embodied norms of international criminal justice and account-
ability so that these norms are internalized by domestic audiences. 
I. THE ICC AND ITS DOMESTIC PERCEPTION LEGITIMACY 
A. Background on the ICC 
By committing to the Rome Statute, States grant the Court au-
tomatic jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.
27
  The Rome Statute provides for three ways that the ICC can 
 
and Cultural Differences in Recognizing Emotions, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 
(2003) 159, 161 (noting that one barrier to cross-cultural communication is that persons of 
the same culture are “generally more accurate in recognizing emotions expressed by mem-
bers of their own culture than in recognizing emotions expressed by members of a different 
cultural group”);  Nancy J. Adler & John L. Graham, Cross-Cultural Interaction: The Inter-
national Comparison Fallacy?, 20 J. OF INT’L BUS. STUD. 515, 517 (citing to research show-
ing that when cultural differences between individuals are great, barriers to communication 
and misunderstandings are more likely).  
 27. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5–8, 11, 12(1). 
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exercise jurisdiction:  first, States Parties may themselves refer situa-
tions to the Prosecutor;
28
 second, the ICC’s Prosecutor may initiate 
investigations proprio motu, or on her own motion and with the ap-
proval of the Court;
29
 and third, the United Nations Security Council, 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, may refer situations to 
the ICC when it concludes that one or more crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction have been committed.
30
  The Security Council is not lim-
ited to referring situations where the crimes were committed on the 
territory of a State Party or committed by the national of a State Par-
ty.
31
 Although the Security Council may refer situations, the ICC op-
erates without oversight, and the Security Council has no veto power 
over investigations or prosecutions.
32
  The Rome Statute expressly 
provides that neither functional nor personal immunity bars the 
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction.33 
The Rome Statute envisions the ICC as a court of last resort.  
The principle of complementarity, which recognizes States’ respon-
sibility and right to prosecute crimes, defines when cases are admis-
sible to the Court.
34
  A case is only admissible if the Prosecutor 
proves that the State with domestic jurisdiction over the crimes has 
shown “inaction”35 or is “unwilling or unable” to investigate or pros-
ecute.
36
 
When a State fails to investigate or prosecute—that is, in cas-
es of complete inaction—the question of unwillingness or inability 
does not arise.
37
  To determine if a State has been inactive, the Court 
 
 28. Id. arts. 13(a), 14. 
 29. Id. arts. 13(c), 15. 
 30. Id. art. 13(b). 
 31. Id. art. 12 (2),(3). 
 32. See Lionel Yee, The International Criminal Court and The Security Council: Arti-
cles 13(b) and 16, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME 
STATUTE 143–52 (Roy S. Lee, ed., 1999); Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities 
Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 55 INT’L ORG. 655, 679–80 (2001) (explain-
ing that while the Security Council members do not have a veto power, a unanimous vote by 
the Security Council may defer a prosecution).   
 33. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 27.  
34. Dragana Radosavljevic, An Overview of the ICC Complementarity Regime, 1 USAK Y.B. 
INT’L POL. & L. 125, 129 (2008). 
 35. Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the 
Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, ICC-
01/04- 01/07-1497, para. 78. 
 36. Rome Statute, supra note 1, Preamble and art. 17(1)(a).  
 37. Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the 
Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, ICC-
01/04- 01/07-1497, para. 78, https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_06998.PDF 
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considers whether a particular perpetrator has been investigated or 
prosecuted for a particular crime.
38
  Thus, if a State proceeds against 
some but not all perpetrators, or charges a perpetrator with an offense 
unrelated to the atrocities committed, that State may be inactive.  The 
ICC only considers whether a State is unwilling or unable to carry 
out genuine proceedings once that State has already begun its inves-
tigation or prosecution.
39
 
Unwillingness includes instances in which national proceed-
ings are a sham or are otherwise inconsistent with an intention to 
bring a perpetrator to justice.
40
  The Rome Statute expressly provides 
that unjustifiably delayed or biased proceedings may exhibit unwill-
ingness.
41
  This basis for admissibility recognizes that some domestic 
proceedings may be for “show” and not intended to hold perpetrators 
accountable.
42
  It also recognizes that domestic proceedings with se-
rious procedural defects “defeat the goals of the criminal process” 
and leave justice “entirely illusory.”43  Inability to proceed includes 
instances in which a State, because of the shortcomings of its judicial 
system, cannot obtain the accused, cannot obtain necessary evidence, 
or is otherwise unable to carry out the proceedings.
44
  A State that 
lacks the necessary judicial and enforcement personnel, or that lacks 
substantive and procedural penal legislation, might be unable to pros-
ecute in accordance with the Rome Statute.
45
 
The ICC, rather than any domestic court, determines whether 
a State has been inactive or is unwilling or unable to proceed. Setting 
aside cases of self-referral, one can imagine that this initial decision 
does little to engender the goodwill of States with domestic jurisdic-
tion over a crime. Should a State disagree with the ICC’s decision, its 
 
[https://perma.cc/64XV-36VU] 
 38. GIDEON BOAS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 73–80 (2011).  
 39. Rome Statute, supra note 1; Christoph Safferling, International Criminal Procedure 
99-100 (2012); International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Informal Expert Pa-
per: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice 7–8 (2003), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30-
907F631453ED/281984/complementarity.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ7W-XGTD] 
 40.  Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2). 
 41. Id. 
 42. John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 41, 50 (Roy Lee ed., 1999)..  
 43. Frederic Megret & Marika Samson, Holding the Line on Complementarity in Lib-
ya, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 571, 586 (2013).  
 44. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(3). 
 45. Informal Expert Paper:  The Principle of Complementarity in Practice, supra note 
39, at 15. 
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leaders and members of the public might take offense and refuse to 
cooperate.  The ensuing noncompliance would pose unique challeng-
es for the ICC. 
The ICC faces structural limitations that distinguish it from 
domestic justice institutions.  Unlike domestic prosecutors, the ICC’s 
Prosecutor has no police force to serve as an investigatory and en-
forcement arm.  The ICC must rely on State consent and cooperation 
to obtain evidence and for the arrest and surrender of suspects.
46
  At 
most, the Prosecutor and Court may issue requests to, seek coopera-
tion from, and enter into arrangements with State and non-State ac-
tors.
47
  Though the Rome Statute provides that States Parties must 
comply with ICC requests,
48
 the ICC has limited power to enforce 
compliance.  It is only empowered to issue findings of State non-
compliance and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or 
to the Security Council, provided the Council first referred the matter 
to the ICC.
49
  To date, the Court’s issuance of a finding and referral 
has not once persuaded a State to comply or prompted the Security 
Council to take action. 
Although some States have cooperated with the ICC and as-
sisted in the arrest and surrender of suspects,
50
 cooperation is not the 
norm.  As noted, States Parties have repeatedly failed to arrest Presi-
dent al-Bashir, despite a 2009 arrest warrant charging al-Bashir with 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide based on violent 
acts committed by his government forces against civilians.
51
  The ar-
rest warrant specifies that al-Bashir played an essential role in coor-
 
 46. See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion 
and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L. & POL. 583, 606 (2007) (stat-
ing that the ICC “lacks a built-in enforcement mechanism and is thus highly dependent upon 
the cooperation and assistance of political powers”).  
 47. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 54(2)(b), (3)(a-d), 87.  
 48. Id. arts. 86, 89.  The Rome Statute provides one exception to its general require-
ment of compliance.  States Parties are permitted to deny requests for the production of evi-
dence relating to national security.  Id. Art. 93(4). 
 49. Id. art. 87(7). 
 50. See, e.g., Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Dominic Ongwen transferred to The Hague  
(Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr1084 
[https://perma.cc/RM6E-T2XZ] (discussing the cooperation of the United Nations and vari-
ous states in the surrender and transfer to the ICC of Lord’s Resistance Army commander, 
Dominic Ongwen); International Justice Monitor Summaries, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
https://www.ijmonitor.org/jean-pierre-bemba-gombo-background/ [https://perma.cc/VDA4-
QPSJ] (discussing the Belgian authorities’ assistance and cooperation in arresting and trans-
ferring to The Hague Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, who was charged with  crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes committed during conflict in the Central African Republic).  
 51. Situation in Darfur, supra note 17. 
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dinating a plan for government forces to murder, torture, and rape ci-
vilians of particular ethnicities.
52
  Still, numerous ICC Member States 
have welcomed al-Bashir into their territory and subsequently al-
lowed him to return to Sudan.
53
 
The events surrounding al-Bashir’s June 2015 visit and es-
cape from South Africa exemplify the ICC’s structural limitations in 
obtaining cooperation from recalcitrant States.  The South African 
government permitted al-Bashir to leave the state even though the 
South African Supreme Court had issued an order—in response to 
the ICC’s arrest warrant—banning al-Bashir’s departure.54  Shortly 
after al-Bashir’s departure, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber considered 
making a finding of non-cooperation under Article 87(7).  The ICC 
sought South Africa’s views on the events surrounding al-Bashir’s 
visit, but South Africa requested an extension for submission of its 
views until its domestic proceedings relating to the visit concluded.
55
  
The domestic proceedings concluded in November 2016, and the 
South African Supreme Court found that the government had de-
faulted on its obligations under the Rome Statute.
56
  In July 2017, the 
ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II concluded the same.57  The Pre-Trial 
Chamber, however, refrained from referring South Africa’s non-
cooperation to the Assembly of States Parties or the Security Coun-
cil.  It decided that referral was “not warranted as a way to obtain co-
operation” because the Security Council had not acted on previous 
referrals of other States Parties that had failed to arrest al-Bashir.
58
 
 
 52. Id.   
 53. See, e.g., Leftie & Kelly, supra note 18; Rice, supra note 18; ICC refers Uganda 
and Djibouti to UN for not arresting al-Bashir, supra note 18.   
 54. South African government loses appeal over failure to arrest Bashir, REUTERS 
(March 15, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-icc-idUSKCN0WH19Y 
[https://perma.cc/MD45-HXRF] 
 55. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Twenty-Fourth Report of the Prosecutor of the Inter-
national Criminal Court to the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 
(2005), ¶ 7 (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/161213-otp-rep-24-
darfur_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8AB-8ESD].  
 56. Id. ¶ 6. 
 57. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision un-
der article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the re-
quest by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, ¶¶ 107–08 (July 6, 2017) 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_04402.PDF [https://perma.cc/NV3H-3ZTP] 
(concluding that as a State Party to the Rome Statute, South Africa was obligated to arrest 
and surrender al-Bashir even if customary international law affords immunity from criminal 
prosecution to heads of state). 
 58. See id. ¶¶ 135–140 (refusing to refer the non-cooperation of South Africa to the 
Assembly of States Parties or the Security Council). 
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Though the ICC is empowered to request State cooperation 
and make findings about non-cooperation, requests and findings have 
proven insufficient to induce compliance when the Court intervenes 
over a State’s objection. 
B. The Need for Domestic Perception Legitimacy 
How can an international court induce compliance with its 
decisions when it lacks power to coerce?  This Article argues that in-
ternational courts can benefit from bottom-up compliance mecha-
nisms, or public pressure.
59
  It focuses on how the ICC can, and in-
deed must, build its stock of domestic perception legitimacy when it 
intervenes in States that are unable or unwilling to prosecute.
60
 
Legitimacy refers to an institution’s right to govern and has 
both objective and subjective dimensions.
61
  Objectively, an institu-
tion is legitimate if its operations and processes are consistent with 
normative performance criteria, like the proportionality of punish-
ments to their crime or procedural fairness.
62
  In the subjective and 
sociological sense, an institution is legitimate when the affected pub-
 
 59. Though written in an article about negotiations rather than compliance, Robert Put-
nam’s words are equally applicable here.  “At the national level, domestic groups pursue 
their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek 
power by constructing coalitions among those groups.  At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while mini-
mizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be 
ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet 
sovereign.”  Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 434 (1988).  
 60. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 21, at 12-13 (explaining that sociological legitima-
cy—referred to here as domestic perception legitimacy—influences the decision calculus of 
actors regarding compliance). 
 61. See Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 20, at 405 (referencing the “normative and 
sociological meanings” of legitimacy). 
 62. Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 411, 414 (2013) (distinguishing objective and subjective con-
ceptions of legitimacy); David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the 
Legitimacy of International Criminal Law 13  (Geo. L., Working Paper, 2008), 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=fwps_pap
ers  [https://perma.cc/37PA-S33K] (explaining that when an institution conforms to certain 
objective requirements for legitimate decision making, it possesses “actual” legitimacy); Al-
lison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 536 (2003) (explaining 
that when an institution conforms to certain objective requirements for legitimate decision 
making, it possesses “actual” legitimacy).  
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lic widely believes that the institution has the right to rule.
63
  As Erik 
Voeten notes, beliefs about an institution “may be influenced by the 
degree to which institutional behavior meets normative or positive 
performance criteria, but not necessarily so.”64  Even if a court oper-
ates fairly, “the public may deem the institution illegitimate (or vice 
versa) for reasons that may seem unfair or arbitrary to normative the-
orists.”65  Allison Danner has argued that the ICC may suffer from an 
objective and subjective legitimacy disconnect.
66
 
The legitimacy disconnect is troubling because domestic per-
ceptions of international institutions influence State compliance, per-
haps more so than whether institutions operate fairly according to 
normative performance criteria.  When the public believes an interna-
tional institution is legitimate, it will “support the continued function-
ing of the institution” even if it disagrees with particular decisions.67  
Moreover, the public will defend the institution and encourage com-
pliance with the institution’s decisions.68  When an institution does 
not enjoy a high degree of public support, it is easier for government 
officials to ignore or otherwise fail to comply with its decisions.
69
 
Domestic perception legitimacy, a form of subjective legiti-
macy, is particularly important in the international context because 
many international institutions are designed without mechanisms to 
coerce compliance.
70
  When an institution cannot force compliance, 
 
 63. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 20, at 405. 
 64. Voeten, supra note 62, at 414.  
 65. Id. 
 66. See Danner, supra note 62, at 536 (positing that while actual and perceived legiti-
macy may coincide, “it is possible that the Prosecutor may act legitimately, but that outside 
entities will not perceive him to be acting legitimately”). 
 67. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal 
Institutions:  Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
459, 460 (1995); see also Yonatan Lupu, International Judicial Legitimacy: Lessons from 
National Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 437, 441 (2013) (noting the close relation-
ship between legitimacy and diffuse support). 
 68. See, e.g., Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 67, at 460; Gregory A. Caldeira & James 
L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the European Union:  Models of Institu-
tional Support, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 356, 363 (1995) (finding that a supportive public 
would defend the European Court of Justice against abolition even if the institution “started 
making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with”).  
 69. Voeten, supra note 62, at 418–19 (citing the British public’s lack of support for the 
European Court of Human Rights to help explain the British government’s failure to comply 
with that court’s decision on prisoner voting rights); Caldeira & Gibson, The Legitimacy of 
the Court of Justice in the European Union, supra note 68, at 363 (reporting the results of 
their study on public perceptions of the European Court of Justice). 
 70. Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations, in 
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the domestic audience must advocate for compliance.  When an insti-
tution enjoys high levels of domestic perception legitimacy, the pub-
lic will step in because it believes in, and views as its own, the norms 
the institution advances.
71
 
For the ICC, high levels of domestic perception legitimacy 
would mean that the public embraces norms of international criminal 
justice and accountability.  If the public believes in those norms, it 
should support, or at least not interfere with, ICC efforts to investi-
gate and prosecute.
72
  When those norms are threatened by govern-
ment action or inaction, the public should also be willing to mobilize 
and encourage its leaders to respond to ICC requests and cooperate 
with the Court and Prosecutor.  Domestic audience mobilization can 
lead recalcitrant governments to comply with their international obli-
gations,
73
 but mobilization is contingent on domestic perception le-
gitimacy.
74
 
 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:  
THE STATE OF THE ART 321, 328 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013).  See also 
Stephen Chaudoin & Terrance Chapman, Contingent Public Support for International Legal 
Institutions 6 (March 21, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law) (arguing that “public attitudes are central to the functioning and effec-
tiveness of international courts precisely because those institutions rely on government con-
sent and cooperation”). 
 71. See Tyler, supra note 20, at 376–79.  Largely independent of the public’s belief 
about institutional legitimacy, some States abide by institutional authority because of inter-
national, strategic self-interest, e.g. international coordination benefits or reputational ef-
fects.  This is consistent with Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory, inasmuch as compli-
ance can still be in the distrustful public’s best interest or can avoid some adverse 
international consequence.  States’ internationally-oriented self-interest in complying with 
ICC requests is largely beyond the scope of this Article, though the concept will be revisited 
in the concluding paragraphs.  Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 20, at 408–11. 
 72. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 20,at 407 (stating that when domestic perception 
legitimacy is high, individuals should “support or at least refrain from interfering” with the 
institution’s decisions). 
 73. BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 152–153 (2009) (producing evidence supporting the importance of do-
mestic mobilization efforts to induce state compliance with international human rights trea-
ties). 
 74. Commentators seem to agree that international criminal tribunals are more likely to 
be successful in fulfilling their goals of providing justice and accountability if they have high 
levels of domestic perception legitimacy.  See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 67. at 443; Laura A. 
Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 306 (2003) (discussing 
how hybrid courts might help to increase the perceived legitimacy of the ICC among local 
populations); William Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law En-
forcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 736737 (2003) (“For a na-
tional government to be politically able to cooperate with an international criminal tribunal, 
the tribunal must be perceived as legitimate by the affected national polity.”).  See also Gib-
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II. THE FACTORS INFLUENCING DOMESTIC PERCEPTION LEGITIMACY 
How might the ICC build domestic perception legitimacy?  It 
is not an easy task.  International courts tend to be far away and for-
eign.
75
  International courts must overcome awareness and under-
standing hurdles that can prevent domestic audiences from knowing 
enough about court purposes and processes to feel a sense of “owner-
ship”—that the court is “theirs,” as opposed to an “alien” body in-
fringing on State sovereignty.
76
 
Reviewing the literature, this Article identifies several factors 
that can positively enhance the public’s perceptions of an objectively 
legitimate international court:  (1) the proximity of the court to the 
affected populace; (2) the quantity and quality of the court’s outreach 
initiatives to increase domestic awareness and understanding of the 
court; (3) the nature of the domestic population’s other opportunities 
to gain awareness and understanding of the court and how it operates; 
and (4) the degree to which the populace trusts its own judicial insti-
tutions.  This Section discusses each of these factors below and ex-
plores the extent to which they provide opportunities for the ICC to 
engender high levels of domestic perception legitimacy in States 
where the Court intervenes over government objection.  This Part 
concludes that the ICC’s most viable, though still difficult, avenue 
for increasing domestic perception legitimacy is conducting in-
person outreach. 
 
son & Caldeira, supra note 67, at 461, 483 (suggesting that the European Court of Justice’s 
lack of domestic perceived legitimacy among citizens of the European Union helps explain 
why few people in those countries are willing to accept a decision with which they do not 
agree).  
 75. See Lupu, supra note 67, at 440 (noting that while many national courts seem to 
have achieved high levels of perceived legitimacy, international courts often find it difficult 
to establish their legitimacy with domestic audiences); Voeten, supra note 62, at 415 (noting 
that supranational justice institutions do not have the same ability to influence domestic au-
diences and “build a stock of legitimacy through opinions that cater to specific constituen-
cies” as do domestic courts); Chaudoin & Chapman, supra note 70, at 3 (stating that “build-
ing legitimacy is a challenging enterprise for international courts, one that is highly context 
specific and subject to contestation across time and space”). 
 76. See Peskin, supra note 25, at 953 (arguing that unlike long-established courts that 
enjoy broad legitimacy, domestic audiences where crimes occurred will often view interna-
tional criminal courts as alien because of “their perceived challenge to state sovereignty, 
domestic conceptions of justice and the belief of a government or society in its own inno-
cence”). 
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A. Proximity of the Court to the Populace 
One way for an international criminal court to build domestic 
perception legitimacy is by locating itself in or near the State where 
the crimes occurred.  When an international court sits in the State 
where the atrocities occurred, victims may observe trials.  Members 
of the public, as well as journalists publishing information for local 
consumption, can also see firsthand how the court functions.
77
  
Though not all citizens will attend the proceedings of a proximately-
located court, “[v]ictims’ families and friends, or even ordinary lower 
income citizens, are more likely to attend proceedings if what is in-
volved is a short bus ride away rather than an international odys-
sey.”78  Locating a court in close proximity to the affected populace 
allows individuals to see the court in action, better understand how 
the court operates, and develop a sense of ownership over proceed-
ings. 
Hybrid courts’ experience supports this theory.  U.N. officials 
have reported that “tens of thousands” attended proceedings before 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and 
that “hundreds of thousands more” followed along on radio or televi-
sion.
79
  A 2008 survey of 250 villages from each of Cambodia’s 
provinces found that the majority of adults had at least a basic under-
standing of the ECCC.
80
  Despite NGOs’ and scholars’ misgivings 
about the ECCC’s objective legitimacy,81 the ECCC enjoys high lev-
els of subjective legitimacy in Cambodia.
82
 
 
 77. See Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts:  Local Empowerment and 
National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347, 363 (2006). 
 78. Id. at 363. 
 79. Miguel de Serpa Soares, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, U.N. Office of 
Legal Affairs, Pledging Conference in Support of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia (ECCC) Statement (Nov. 7 2013), http://legal.un.org/ola/media/ 
info_from_lc/mss/speeches/MSS_ECCC_Pledging_Conference_5-Nov-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P24C-4Q8V] 
 80. Phuong Pham et al., So We Will Never Forget: A Population-Based Survey on At-
titudes About Social Reconstruction and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cam-
bodia 40 (2008) (finding that at least 61% of surveyed Cambodians knew enough about the 
ECCC to have informed expectations about the ECCC’s ability to process its caseload and 
deliver international criminal justice and accountability). 
 81. See, e.g., Wayne Sandholtz, Creating Authority by the Council: the International 
Criminal Tribunals, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
AUTHORITY 150 (Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds, 2008).   
 82. Pham, supra note 80, at 39 (finding that 87% of  surveyed Cambodians believe that 
the ECCC should be involved in responding to the atrocities that took place under than 
Khmer Rouge). 
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In contrast, when courts are located far from the scene of the 
atrocities, domestic populations might be less trusting of, and might 
feel less of a connection to, judicial proceedings.
83
  Ethnographic re-
search shows that legal professionals in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
were suspicious of, and ill-informed about, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia—in large part because of the 
ICTY’s location in The Hague rather than the Balkans.84 
The ICC could hold trials within situation States to increase 
its chances of persuading domestic audiences of its legitimacy.  The 
Rome Statute permits the Court to sit regionally.
85
  To date, however, 
the ICC has held its hearings and trials in The Hague.  Despite its 
domestic perception legitimacy benefits, sitting regionally would 
have serious drawbacks.  Sitting regionally would impose additional 
costs on the under-resourced
86
 ICC, as Court personnel would have 
to move or travel to the situation State, potentially for years.
87
  For 
cases in which the ICC is proceeding over government objection, 
holding the trials in the national jurisdiction could pose safety risks to 
 
 83. See Dickinson, supra note 74, at 302. 
 84. See Laurel Fletcher & Harvey Weinstein, Justice, Accountability and Social Re-
construction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L 
L. 102, 136–40 (2000) (noting complaints about the use of foreign expert witnesses with no 
personal connection to the cases, the way in which investigations and prosecutions were pri-
oritized, the limited communication with domestic audiences, the expense and delay of re-
mote trials, and the inaccessibility of the venue for families awaiting trial).  
 85. See Burke-White, supra note 74, at 750–51 (citing to Rome Statute, supra note 1, 
at art. 3 which provides that “The Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desira-
ble, as provided in this Statute”).  
 86. See, e.g., Lilian Ochieng & Simon Jennings, International Criminal Court Secures 
Budget Increase, DAILY NATION (Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/International-Criminal-Court-Budget-Increase/-
/1056/2150244/-/e7oca3/-/index.html [https://perma.cc/NYA2-7HXZ] (quoting an expert 
international justice as stating that the ICC “operates on a shoestring budget”); Jonathan 
O’Donohue, International Criminal Court at Risk, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 6, 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/06/international-criminal-court-risk 
[https://perma.cc/5RV6-M9Z8] (noting that because of the ICC’s tight budget, Prosecutor 
Bensouda said she has had to scale down resources for investigating crimes in Libya and to 
delay investigations into crimes committed in the Ivory Coast). 
 87. Trials can last for years.  For example, the trial proceedings in the ICC’s case 
against Thomas Lubanga occurred over at two-year period.  The prosecution presented its 
evidence between January and Summer 2009. The defense case started in January 2010 and 
ended in April 2011.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FIRST VERDICT AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR VS. THOMAS LUBANGA DYILO, QUESTIONS 
AND ANSWERS (2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/ 
2012_DRC_Lubanga.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4PY-K55T]. 
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judges and other personnel.
88
  The ICC may have to provide addi-
tional and costly security.  Finally, some national jurisdictions may 
lack sufficient courtroom facilities to provide seating for public view-
ing and to meet the technological needs of mass atrocity trials. 
Sitting close to the scene of the atrocities is an avenue the 
ICC could pursue in the future, but the Court would have to weigh 
that decision carefully and the Assembly of States Parties may have 
to increase the ICC’s budget.  Though the budget can be increased, 
States already committed to capping the ICC’s budget89 would have 
to be persuaded that additional funding would bear results. 
B. Quantity and Quality of the Court’s Outreach 
An international criminal court may also be able to enhance 
domestic perception legitimacy through significant in-person out-
reach.
90
  Outreach can raise public awareness and understanding of a 
tribunal’s work,91 and may even foster a sense of ownership among 
members of the public.  The International Center for Transitional Jus-
tice has explicitly linked outreach to legitimacy, stating that the “final 
aims of outreach programs should be to promote public engagement 
 
 88. Threats in such cases are not uncommon.  In the trial against former Guatemalan 
dictator Rios Montt, charging him with crimes against humanity and genocide, judges and 
prosecutors received threats of physical harm from Guatemalan army associates operating 
under the leadership of Guatemalan President General Otto Perez Molina.  Genocide Trial of 
Former Dictator Rios Montt Suspended After Intervention by Guatemalan President, 
DEMOCRACY NOW (April 19, 2013), https://www.democracynow.org/2013/4/19/genocide 
_trial_of_former_dictator_ros [https://perma.cc/M94K-ANPY]. 
 89. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Annual ICC Assembly: States Hold 
Ground on ICC, But Serious Challenges Remain (Dec. 5, 2016), 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20161205/annual-icc-assembly-states-hold-ground-
icc-serious-challenges-remain [https://perma.cc/G77J-J8SH] (noting that some of the most 
powerful and wealthy states wanted to impose a zero-growth budget increase on the ICC in 
2017).. 
 90. The International Center for Transitional Justice defines “outreach” as “a set of 
tools—the combination of materials and activities—that a [transitional justice] measure puts 
in place to build direct channels of communication with affected communities, to raise 
awareness of the justice process and promote understanding of the measure.” CLARA 
RAMIREZ BARAT, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, MAKING AN IMPACT: 
GUIDELINES ON DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING OUTREACH PROGRAMS FOR TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE,  7 (2011), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Making-Impact-
2011-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/34ZR-ASPC]. 
 91. See, e.g., Higonnet, supra note 77, at 418–19 (suggesting that one reason Rwan-
dans perceived the ICTR negatively was due to limited or bad outreach efforts); Jane E. 
Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on Building 
the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 251, 260–61, 281 (2007).  
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and ownership of the justice process, thereby contributing to building 
its legitimacy and lasting impact.”92  Absent outreach, especially for 
remotely-located courts, the public may have few opportunities to 
learn how a court truly functions. Commentators cite the ICTY’s six-
year lag in commencing outreach as one reason why domestic audi-
ences believed the tribunal was biased and illegitimate.
93
  Without 
ICTY outreach, local media and politicians had captive domestic au-
diences to which they could spread disinformation about the tribu-
nal.
94
 
The ICC does have a designated Public Information and Out-
reach Section, which maintains field offices in or near the States in 
which the ICC has active investigations.
95
  The ICC has emphasized 
that “[p]eople most affected by the crimes have the right to under-
stand, to participate in, and to have a sense of ownership of the jus-
tice process.”96  Nevertheless, to spread awareness of the Court, the 
ICC has primarily used mass media communications, rather than in-
person outreach.
97
  Data collected in 2009 show that this approach, at 
least in the Central African Republic, disproportionately reached 
wealthy, educated men but not information-poor groups that rely on 
“interpersonal communication channels at marketplaces or other so-
cial gatherings.”98  The communities most likely to include witnesses 
to, or victims of, atrocities—displaced populations, minority groups 
suffering discrimination, former combatants, etc.—are those least 
likely to benefit from the ICC’s mass media communications.99 
 
 92. Barat, supra note 90, at 7.  
 93. See, e.g., Janine Natalya Clark, International War Crimes Tribunals and the Chal-
lenge of Outreach, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 99, 104–05 (2009). 
 94. Mark Ellis, The Contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations to the Creation 
of International Criminal Tribunals, in Research Handbook on International Criminal Law 
163 (Bartram Brown ed., 2011). 
 95. Int’l Crim. Ct., Proposed Programme Budget for 2017 of the International Crimi-
nal Court, 165 https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/ICC-ASP-15-10-ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L3X4-QYRE] (listing field offices in CAR, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, Geor-
gia, Mali, and Kenya). 
 96. Int’l Crim. Ct., Interacting with Communities Affected by Crimes, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/about/interacting-with-communities?ln=en (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/9NUV-JXAQ] 
 97. Patrick Vinck & Phuong N. Pham, Outreach Evaluation: The International Crimi-
nal Court in the Central African Republic, THE INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST., 1, 17 (2010), 
https://hhi.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/publications/outreach-evaluation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A74Z-ESQA] 
 98. Id. at 20-21.  
 99. Id.  
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Ideally, the ICC’s efforts would follow Victor Peskin’s en-
gagement model of outreach.
100
  This model moves beyond merely 
making the tribunal’s work more comprehensible to the public.  En-
gagement envisions in-person
101
 interaction, contact, and dialogue 
between tribunal personnel and the public through forums like town 
hall meetings.  Through these forums, tribunal personnel can high-
light the institution’s process, goals, and accomplishments while ad-
dressing any perceived shortcomings.
102
  This was the approach taken 
by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in its outreach pro-
gram, referred to as the “gold standard” of tribunal outreach initia-
tives.
103
  The SCSL Registrar and Prosecutor held town hall meetings 
throughout Sierra Leone and maintained a dedicated Outreach Sec-
tion, staffed by Sierra Leonean nationals.
104
  Empirical evidence sug-
gests that a significant portion of Sierra Leone’s population was 
aware of the SCSL and believed that it contributed to domestic 
peace.
105
 
The SCSL, however, was created at the request of Sierra Leo-
ne’s government.  When intervening over government objection, the 
ICC may face government-imposed obstacles.  As this Article shows 
in its Section III case study, State leaders can use their power to im-
pede the ICC’s ability to access their domestic audience.  Though 
 
    100.   Peskin, supra note 25, at 954–955. 
 101. See generally, Daniel Balliet, Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilem-
mas:  A Meta-Analytic Review, 54 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 39, 46–48 (2009) (referencing studies 
showing that face-to-face, rather than written, communications enhanced cooperation in a 
broad range of social dilemmas, one reason being that it allowed the participants to more 
accurately and effectively address concerns); Mina Chang, Why Face-To-Face Meetings Are 
So Important, FORBES (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellevate 
/2015/02/20/why-face-to-face-meetings-are-so-important/#25b858a6aee9 
[https://perma.cc/WMX6-HBWK] (noting how face-to-face meetings can help to build trust 
and understanding). 
 102. Peskin, supra note 25, at 954–55. 
 103. Clark, supra note 93, at 106 (quoting a conversation with former ICTY Deputy 
Prosecutor David Tolbert).   
 104. Rachel Kerr & Jessica Lincoln, King’s Coll. London, War Crimes Research Group, 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone:  Outreach, Legacy and Impact 4, 11 (2008).   
 105. This Article attributes the SCSL’s domestic perception legitimacy in part to the 
SCSL’s outreach program.  See Allison Smith, NPWJ Survey on the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone Highlights Wide and Deep Impact of the Court on Ending Impunity and Strengthening 
the Rule of Law, NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://www.npwj.org/ICC/NPWJ-Survey-Special-Court-Sierra-Leone-highlights-wide-and-
deep-impact-Court-ending-impunity-and [https://perma.cc/89E9-EY2X] (referencing a sur-
vey suggesting that a significant portion of the Sierra Leone population was aware of the 
Special Court and believed that it contributed to peace in the country, which the author at-
tributes in part to the Outreach Program). 
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ICC personnel can travel to States in which documents and witnesses 
are located,
106
 they do not enjoy unfettered access to places or peo-
ple.  Indeed, the Rome Statute does not obligate States Parties to pro-
vide any access to ICC personnel for general outreach efforts.  With-
out in-person access to the domestic populace, the ICC may not be 
able to replicate the SCSL’s outreach success. 
If access for ICC personnel is limited, civil society organiza-
tions could aid the ICC in its outreach efforts.  NGO-developed radio 
documentaries and traveling plays  had a great impact on Rwandan’s 
understanding of post-genocide reconciliation issues.
107
  Though 
helpful, civil society organizations will not always be able to conduct 
in-person outreach.  Many governments do not allow civil society or-
ganizations to operate freely and have implemented measures to stifle 
or silence NGOs.
108
  This means that in-person outreach efforts by 
NGOs – like those in Rwanda – may not be an option for the ICC. 
Conducting in-person outreach, like sitting regionally, could 
be costly and may require States Parties to increase the ICC’s budget.  
Still, in-person outreach, whether through the Outreach Section or 
civil society organizations, seems necessary for reaching infor-
mation-poor groups and staving off the circulation of disinformation. 
C. The Populace’s Other Opportunities for Awareness and 
Understanding 
Even without in-person outreach, domestic audiences may 
have opportunities to learn about an institution.  As suggested in the 
previous subsection, it is unlikely that the ICC’s target populations 
will be able to take full advantage of these opportunities and learn 
enough about how the ICC operates to feel connected with the Court. 
Although the ICC maintains a website with documents and 
other information, few people in the States where the ICC intervenes 
 
    106.   Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 93.  
 107. Marie-Chantal Kalisa, Theatre and the Rwandan Genocide, 18 PEACE REV.: A J. OF 
SOC. JUST. 515, 515-516 (2006). 
 108. See, e.g., Priyanka Boghani, Putin’s Legal Crackdown on Civil Society, PBS (Jan. 
13, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/putins-legal-crackdown-on-civil-
society/ [https://perma.cc/PGJ2-BNHR] (discussing the 2012 “foreign agent law,” signed by 
Russian President Vladimir Putin, requiring NGOs receiving funding from outside Russia to 
register as “foreign agents” and be subject to mandatory audits); Laetitia Bader, Civil Society 
Crackdown in Ethiopia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 4, 2013), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/04/civil-society-crackdown-ethiopia 
[https://perma.cc/42DW-TQZX] (discussing laws passed by the ruling party in Ethiopia at-
tacking civil society, making human rights work in the country almost impossible). 
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are likely to seek out and rely on these sources.  Much of the world, 
and particularly individuals in the poorest nations, lack regular inter-
net access.
109
  Illiteracy may be high among populations that have 
been affected by mass atrocities.
110
  Even if domestic populations are 
literate, they may not read one of the languages in which the ICC 
makes information available:  English and French. 
With limited convenient and accessible ways to learn about 
the Court from ICC-issued materials, domestic audiences may in-
stead obtain information from their local media.  Survey research 
shows that the vast majority of Bosnians and Croatians never visited 
the ICTY’s website; instead, those domestic audiences learned about 
the ICTY through television and radio programs.
111
  While conven-
ient sources of information, some journalists not only have personal 
biases but also may provide selective or false information.
112
  In 
some States, government leaders control the press.
113
 Leaders can use 
 
 109. See Billions of People in Developing World Still Without Internet Access, UN 
NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story 
.asp?NewsID=51924#.WN6ccBLyvVo [https://perma.cc/NL3C-UY6U] (reporting that 57 
percent of the world’s populace, and over 90 percent of people in the poorest countries, are 
without broadband internet); Michael Pizzi, Survey: 54% in Developing World Use Internet, 
AL JAZEERA (Feb. 22, 2016), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2016/2/22/study-54-
percent-in-developing-world-use-internet.html [https://perma.cc/T5XU-GJQB] (stating that 
while almost half of those living in  developing nations have at least occasional access to the 
internet, amongst the poorest countries, internet usage rates are below 20%). 
 110. See, e.g., Kerr & Lincoln, supra note 104, at 12 (stating that illiteracy rate in Sierra 
Leone, where the Special Court of Sierra Leone was located, is between 70-80%). Data from 
UNICEF indicates that literacy rates for the least developed countries in the world average 
about 60%. See Literacy, UNICEF DATA, https://data.unicef.org/topic/education/literacy/ 
(last updated Apr. 2016) [https://perma.cc/F57Q-KDNG]. 
 111. See Marko Milanovic, Establishing the Facts About Mass Atrocities: Accounting 
for the Failure of the ICTY to Persuade Target Audiences, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1321, 1332 
(2016).  
 112. Id. at 1331 n. 30 (citing a survey that found that 27% of Croatians believed local 
media sources reported subjectively on ICTY proceedings).  
 113. See, e.g., Jill Dougherty, How the Media Became One of Putin’s Most Powerful 
Weapons, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive 
/2015/04/how-the-media-became-putins-most-powerful-weapon/391062/ 
[https://perma.cc/AK8T-YLSC] (stating that in Russia, President Putin has put “not only 
state media but privately owned broadcast media under the Kremlin’s influence,” controlling 
the information citizens receive from television, news, radio, and even the internet); Sabrina 
Martin, Venezuelan Army Enlisted to Crack Down on Independent Media, PANAM POST 
(Feb. 28, 2017), https://panampost.com/sabrina-martin/2017/02/28/venezuelan-army-
enlisted-to-crack-down-on-independent-media/ [https://perma.cc/8CED-KM9V] (discussing 
the Venezuelan government’s plan to increase censorship of the media); Charlotte Alfred, 
Watch These Fearless Ugandan Journalists Broadcast Their Own Arrests, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/uganda-media-
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that control to ensure that the local media only issues negative reports 
and commentaries about the ICC. 
In addition to using the media to inundate the public with dis-
information, government leaders can use their access advantage to di-
rectly address the public.  They can address the public wherever and 
as frequently as they wish.  Moreover, government leaders share a 
culture
114
 with their domestic audience and thus face few or none of 
the cross-cultural barriers to communication
115
 that may affect ICC 
attempts to build domestic perception legitimacy.
116
  Leaders have 
the power not only to launch propaganda campaigns against the ICC, 
but also the ability to message in a way that resonates with the public. 
No doubt, the ICC can and should use a range of methods to 
help domestic audiences understand its purpose, functions, and pro-
cesses.  Remote communications and campaigns, though, are not a 
complete substitute for in-person outreach.  As discussed, with face-
to-face communication, ICC personnel have a better chance of mak-
ing a connection with domestic audiences and persuading them to 
trust the Court. 
 
crackdown_us_56d5d6f5e4b0bf0dab33808c [https://perma.cc/45FL-88ZU] (discussing the 
Ugandan government’s crackdown on the media after disputed election results wherein Mu-
seveni again assumed the presidency).  
 114. Culture refers to “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from others.”  See Geert Hofstede, Dimension-
alizing Cultures:  The Hofstede Model in Context, ONLINE READINGS IN PSYCHOL. & 
CULTURE, 3(2011),  http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014& 
context=orpc. Culture serves “as a framework for an individual’s actions, thoughts, and 
communication patterns,” controlling behavior in deep and unconscious ways.”  Stephen 
Michael Croucher et al.,, Argumentativeness and Political Participation:  A Cross-Cultural 
Analysis in the United States and Turkey, 64 COMM. STUD. 18, 20 (2013). 
 115. The literature points to the difficulties of cross-cultural communication.  See, e.g., 
Hillary Anger Elfenbein & Nalini Ambady, Universals and Cultural Differences in Recog-
nizing Emotions, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 159, 161 (2003) (noting that one 
barrier to cross-cultural communication is that persons of the same culture are “generally 
more accurate in recognizing emotions expressed by members of their own culture than in 
recognizing emotions expressed by members of a different cultural group”); Nancy J. Adler 
& John L. Graham, Cross-Cultural Interaction: The International Comparison Fallacy?, 20 
J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 515, 517 (1989) (citing to research showing that when cultural differ-
ences between individuals are great, barriers to communication and misunderstandings are 
more likely).  
 116. See Julie Spencer-Rodgers & Timothy McGovern, Attitudes Toward the Culturally 
Different:  The Role of Intercultural Communication Barriers, Affective Responses, Consen-
sual Stereotypes, and Perceived Threat, 26 INT’L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 609, 611 (2002) 
(referencing research). 
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D. The Degree to Which the Populace Trusts its Own Courts 
When domestic audiences have little direct experience with, 
or significant knowledge about, an international court, they use do-
mestic courts as a proxy for judging the international court’s legiti-
macy.
117
  Individuals who trust national courts are more likely to trust 
unfamiliar international courts.
118
  As a corollary, individuals who 
distrust domestic courts transfer those negative feelings when form-
ing opinions about international courts.  To illustrate, within the Eu-
ropean Union, “countries where fewer people trust their national ju-
diciaries are also countries in which fewer people express trust in the 
[European Court of Justice].”119 
This phenomenon strains the ability of the ICC to achieve 
domestic perception legitimacy.  Because the ICC is a remote, for-
eign judicial institution, domestic audiences may have little actual 
knowledge about the Court before it intervenes.  Furthermore, do-
mestic audiences in States where the ICC intervenes may not trust 
their national justice systems.  After all, the ICC brings cases only as 
a last resort, when the State has taken no steps to prosecute, or is un-
willing or unable to prosecute, those responsible for mass atroci-
ties.
120
  States meeting that threshold, whether because of complicity, 
corruption, or serious procedural due process defects, likely have 
weak rule of law.  Weak rule of law leads domestic audiences to 
question the fairness of their justice system.
121
  When the ICC inter-
venes over government objection, it likely will have to convince the 
public that it is a different kind of court—one that operates fairly.  
With a domestic audience already suspicious of justice institutions, 
in-person outreach becomes even more important. 
 
 117. Chaudoin and Chapman make this point about individuals and the ICC. “Prior to an 
ICC investigation, citizens typically have very little experience with the court. They have 
little data, precedents or a track record of cases with which to form their beliefs. Diffuse le-
gitimacy may therefore be driven by citizens’ perceptions of their national courts.” Chaudoin 
& Chapman, supra note 70, at 7 (citing to Voeten). 
 118. See, e.g., Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 68, at 459 (discussing opinions about the 
Court of Justice for the European Union); Voeten, supra note 62, at 416 (hypothesizing that 
“individuals who trust national courts are also more likely to trust international courts”). 
 119. Voeten, supra note 62, at 425. 
 120. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17 (complementarity provision).  
 121. See James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy 
of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 345 (1998) (citing West Germany as a 
state where the rule of law was only introduced after WWII and where diffuse support for 
national courts took about a generation to develop).  
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E. Conclusion 
The discussion above demonstrates the difficult road the ICC 
must travel to achieve domestic perception legitimacy when the 
Court intervenes over government objection.  The ICC is reliant on 
in-person outreach, but State leaders hostile to the institution have the 
upper hand in setting domestic discourse:  they are proximate actors; 
they can deny ICC personnel in-person access to the domestic audi-
ence; and they can use their access and communication advantages to 
undermine the ICC’s efforts to persuade the public of its credibility 
and vision.  Moreover, domestic audiences may already distrust 
courts.  If ICC personnel cannot meet face-to-face with domestic au-
diences to address misgivings about the Court, the ICC has little 
chance of inspiring public mobilization to pressure State compliance 
with Court requests and orders. 
The Kenya case study demonstrates the seriousness of the ac-
cess and communication disadvantages the ICC faces when interven-
ing over government objections.  The case study also illustrates why 
States and other supporters of the Court must aid it in its efforts to 
engender domestic perception legitimacy. 
III. KENYA-AS-ILLUSTRATION:  ICC OUTREACH AND THE DOMESTIC 
NARRATIVE 
A. Introducing the Kenya Case Study 
The Kenyan presidential election of December 27, 2007 pre-
cipitated a months-long humanitarian crisis that left over 1,000 dead 
and an estimated 660,000 displaced.
122
  Under a cloud of suspi-
cion,
123
 the Kenyan electoral commission declared that Mwai Kibaki, 
the incumbent and the Party of National Unity (PNU) candidate, had 
won.
124
  Supporters of Raila Odinga, the Orange Democratic Move-
 
 122. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, KENYA: WANING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR JUSTICE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 4  (2015) https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/204000/ 
afr320032014en.pdf [https://perma.cc/376T-LTXN]. 
 123. Third-party, international review of the election shows that the process was, in fact, 
deeply flawed. See e.g., EU Election Observation Mission, Kenya Final Report on General 
Elections 27 December 2007 (Apr. 3, 2008) http://www.eods.eu/library/FR%20KENYA 
%2003.04.2008_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R99-4QR2]; US Ambassador Michael Ranne-
berger Telex (“we found evidence of rigging on both sides”), 
http://www.kenyadocex.com/wiki/foia-release-doc-no-c17443900-january-2008/ 
[https://perma.cc/7EFJ-BXL7].  
 124. Jeffrey Gettleman, Disputed Vote Plunges Kenya into Bloodshed N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
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ment (ODM) candidate, protested, setting fire to cars and build-
ings.
125
  The police response, in combination with the response from 
PNU supporters, led to widespread violence.  Because of Kenya’s 
ethnically polarized voting, the violence escalated along ethnic lines. 
African Union Chairman John Kufuor and former U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan were brought in to mediate the crisis, which 
ended when Kibaki and Odinga signed the National Accord and Rec-
onciliation Act 2008 to create a coalition government.
126
 
Though the Kenyan government initially expressed a desire to 
establish a special tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for the 
post-election violence, it repeatedly failed to do so.
127
  When it be-
came clear that Kenya was going to allow impunity to reign, the ICC 
stepped in.  On November 26, 2009, the ICC Prosecutor opened a 
proprio motu investigation regarding the post-election violence.
128
  
The Court authorized the investigation on March 31, 2010, noting the 
“inactivity on the part of the Kenyan authorities to address the poten-
tial responsibility of those who are likely to be the focus of the 
Court’s investigation.”129  By the end of the year, the ICC Prosecutor 
had brought crimes against humanity charges against five high-level 
Kenyan government officials and one prominent journalist.
130
  The 
ICC Prosecutor alleged that William Ruto,
131
 Henry Kosgey,
132
 and 
Joshua arap Sang
133
 had orchestrated violence against PNU members 
after the election results were announced.  He further alleged that 
 
31, 2007 at A1 
 125. Id.; Scores Dead in Kenya Poll Clashes, BBC (Dec. 31, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7165602.stm [https://perma.cc/BMF5-M4JG]. 
 126. Monica Kathina Juma, African Mediation of the Kenyan post-2007 Election Crisis, 
27 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 407, 412-13 (2009).  
 127. How Kenya Handled Local Tribunal Process, DAILY NATION (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/How+Kenya+handled+local+tribunal+process++/-
/1064/1997172/-/iko52x/-/index.html [https://perma.cc/C3GW-MWEN]. 
 128. Pre-Trial Chamber II, Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to 
Article 15, ICC-01/09, https://www.legal-tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/doc785972_06.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K2JM-KCSS] 
 129. Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation in the Situation in the Republic of Kenya,  
ICC-01/09, ¶¶ 54, 184–185 https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_02399.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/8JJL-5LBG] 
 130. See Kenya’s Post Election Violence, supra note 22. 
 131. Then Minister of Higher Education, Science, and Technology and a Member of 
Parliament.  Ruto became Kenya’s Deputy President in 2013. 
 132. Then Minister of Industrialization and a Member of Parliament.  
 133. Then Head of Operations of KASS FM, a prominent news radio station.  
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Uhuru Kenyatta,
134
 Francis Muthaura,
135
 and Mohammad Ali
136
 had 
responded to the attacks on PNU members by developing and execut-
ing a plan to attack ODM supporters.
137
 
Though the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber refused to confirm 
charges against Kosgey and Ali, the OTP actively prosecuted four of 
the Kenya cases for several years.
138
  The ICC Prosecutor maintained 
charges against Mathaura and Kenyatta until 2013 and 2014, respec-
tively.
139
  The cases against Ruto and Sang were vacated in 2016.
140
 
 
 134. Then Deputy Prime Minister and Head of Finance.  Kenyatta became Kenya’s 
President in 2013.  
 135. Then Head of the Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet and Chairman of the 
National Security Advisory Committee.   
 136. Then Chief Executive of the Postal Corporation of Kenya and a former Commis-
sioner of the Kenyan Police.  
 137. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Prosecutor’s Application Pur-
suant to Article 58 as to William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap 
Sang, ¶¶ 4–6 (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1367853.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9A6F-4JW3].  In January 2012, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber refused to 
confirm charges against Kosgey and Ali, concluding that the prosecutor had not met the nec-
essary evidentiary threshold for proceeding.  See Pre-Trial Chamber II, Request for Authori-
sation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, supra note 128, at 110, 138; Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation in the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 129, at  152; Tom Maliti, 
ICC Confirms Charges Against Four Out of Six Kenyan Suspects, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Jan. 
23, 2012) http://www.ijmonitor.org/2012/01/icc-confirms-charges-against-four-out-of-six-
kenyan-suspects/ [https://perma.cc/KRR6-H564]. 
 138. Few ICC cases have actually proceeded to a trial against suspects who have ap-
peared in The Hague. Excluding the Kenyan defendants and persons prosecuted for “admin-
istration of justice offenses,” the suspects the ICC has brought to trial as of March 2017 in-
clude Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (Mali), Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (CAR), Germain 
Katanga (DRC), Charles Blé Goudé (Ivory Coast), Laurent Gbagbo (Ivory Coast), Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo (DRC), Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (DRC), Bosco Ntaganda (DRC), and Domi-
nic Ongwen (Uganda). See Defendants, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/cases.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/WMT2-2H2T].  Each 
of the situations in Mali, the CAR, the DRC, and Uganda involved self-referrals. See Situa-
tions under Investigation, , INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QH2S-TWK2]. 
 139. See Luis Moreno Ocampo, Int’l Crim. Ct. Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Ct., Statement by 
ICC Prosecutor on the Notice to Withdraw Charges Against Mr Muthaura (Mar. 11, 2013), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=OTP-statement-11-03-2013 
[https://perma.cc/RGQ2-H84M]; Fatou Bensouda, Int’l Crim. Ct. Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Ct., 
Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the 
withdrawal of charges against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Dec. 5, 2014),  https://www.icc-
cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=otp-statement-05-12-2014-2 [https://perma.cc/67NZ-
477T]. 
 140. Marlise Simons and Jeffrey Gettleman, International Criminal Court Drops Case 
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In each of the four cases, charges were withdrawn because of issues 
relating to witness tampering and State obstruction of the ICC Prose-
cutor’s efforts to gather evidence.  On September 19, 2016, the Court 
issued a finding of Kenyan noncompliance in the Kenyatta case and 
referred the matter to the Assembly of States Parties.  These out-
comes suggest that the ICC did not build enough domestic perception 
legitimacy to induce the public to pressure government officials into 
compliance. 
This Article focuses on the Kenya cases because the Kenyan 
situation was not self-referred.  Kenya evidenced no intention of aid-
ing and supporting the ICC in its efforts to develop evidence to pros-
ecute the accused.  Instead, Kenya objected to and fought the ICC’s 
intervention.
141
  Using the Kenya cases, this Article explores whether 
and to what extent government leaders used their access and commu-
nication advantages to negatively influence public perception of the 
ICC.  Importantly, the Kenya cases were active for several years. 
With active cases, the ICC has the greatest need for compliance and 
thus the greatest incentive to build domestic perception legitimacy 
through public engagement.  This Article searches the multi-year 
record for evidence of ICC outreach efforts and countervailing State 
action. 
In addition to drawing on documentary evidence, this Article 
draws on interviews conducted during 2015 and 2016 with Kenyan 
elites, as well as employees of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor.
142
 
 
Against Kenya’s William Ruto, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/africa/william-ruto-kenya-icc.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/99FC-F6UU] (referencing the vacated cases); Tom Maliti, Appeals Cham-
ber Reverses Decision on Witness Statements, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Feb. 12, 2016), 
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/02/appeals-chamber-reverses-decision-on-witness-
statements/ [https://perma.cc/7LGQ-DJH2] (referencing the Appeals Chamber decision). 
 141. See, e.g., Nicholas Kulish, Kenyan Lawmakers Vote to Leave International Court,  
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/world/africa/kenyan-
lawmakers-vote-to-leave-international-court.html?pagewanted=all&amp;_r=0 [ 
https://perma.cc/A2DS-6MX2](quoting the majority leader in the Kenyan National Assem-
bly as saying, “[t]he sovereign state of Kenya, with a functioning judiciary, with a vibrant 
democracy, one of the best democracies in Africa, is under threat.”). 
 142. The Author, aided by colleagues, conducted interviews with twenty five Kenyan 
former government officials, media persons, academics, and leaders in civil society and 
think tanks. The Kenyan interviewees varied in political and ethnic affiliation. These inter-
views were conducted in Nairobi during summer and fall 2015. Additional interviews of cur-
rent and former ICC personnel were conducted during summer 2016. The interviews with 
Kenyan elites were done as part of a project being funded by The Hague Institute for Global 
Justice (The Hague Institute) entitled, “The Peace-Justice Nexus: The Potential Impact of the 
ICC on Conflict, Mass Atrocities, and Human Rights Violations.” Two researchers from The 
Hague Institute, Eamon Aloyo and Tessa Alleblas, participated in the Kenya interviews, as 
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NPI-Africa, a local civil society organization with extensive experi-
ence working on peace and conflict transformation in Kenya,
143
 or-
ganized interviews with persons knowledgeable about Kenya’s inter-
actions with the ICC.  The Author organized interviews with current 
and former ICC personnel.  In presenting perspectives from both 
Kenyans and ICC personnel, this Article hopes to provide robust and 
informative qualitative data on domestic perception legitimacy. 
B. Evidence from Kenya 
The data show that the Kenyan government played a role in 
impeding the ICC’s conduct of in-person public outreach.  Govern-
ment officials made ICC personnel feel unsafe in Kenya and failed to 
protect them from third-party threats.  The government encouraged 
public apprehension of speaking with ICC personnel.  Further, the 
government stymied the efforts of civil society organizations that 
could have aided the ICC in conducting in-person outreach.  These 
setbacks were exacerbated by the ICC’s budget and resources limita-
tions. 
The data also show that Kenyan leaders were able to com-
municate effectively with the public to besmirch the reputation of the 
ICC.  Kenyatta and Ruto, elected President and Deputy President in 
March 2013, repeatedly accused the Court of being a colonialist insti-
tution biased against Africa and infringing on Kenya’s sovereignty.  
They waged a disinformation campaign to frustrate ICC efforts to 
raise awareness and understanding of ICC functions and processes.  
As discussed below, the government narrative resonated with the 
public, which grew wary of the Court and the charges brought against 
domestic leaders. 
1. Raising Awareness and Understanding 
The first three factors, identified above, that bear on domestic 
perception legitimacy implicate the domestic audience’s actual 
awareness and understanding of an international institution.  When an 
international court sits regionally, it creates avenues for in-person 
 
well as the interviews with ICC personnel. In Kenya, Nahashon Kariuiki from NPI-Africa 
also participated in several interviews. Because of the sensitivity of the topics addressed dur-
ing the interviews, interviewees were promised that their identities would not be revealed in 
any reports or publications. 
 143. For more information about NPI-Africa, see NPI AFRICA, http://www.npi-
africa.org/ [https://perma.cc/3NMS-EV78] (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). 
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participation in its proceedings.  When an international court or its 
civil society allies engage in in-person outreach, they actively engage 
members of the domestic audience, who learn about the court and its 
functions.  Finally, when an international court produces written out-
reach materials or radio programs, it strives to explain its functions 
and goals to the domestic audience. 
When an international court fails to raise awareness and un-
derstanding, it does nothing to dispel the domestic audience’s likely 
preconceptions of the international court’s ability to operate fairly 
and deliver just outcomes.  Moreover, failure to raise awareness and 
understanding leaves the international court vulnerable to attacks and 
disinformation spread by hostile parties. 
a. ICC Outreach 
The ICC Outreach Section’s in-person efforts in Kenya were 
limited.  One interviewee, a Kenyan civil society leader, suggested 
that the ICC Field Outreach Coordinator visited Kenya fewer than 
five times during the investigations and prosecutions.
144
  The Out-
reach Coordinator allegedly spent most her time in Eldoret, a major 
urban center, and with Kenyan elites—rather than in village settings 
or with members of the general public.
145
  Leadership at Mawingu 
Camp, which housed more than 1,000 internally-displaced families, 
reported that the families were “waiting to see [ICC] officials and 
talk to them, but none have been here so far.”146  The only visitors to 
Mawingu Camp were politicians, coming to “demonise the ICC.”147 
These accounts are consistent with the ICC’s annual outreach 
reports.
148
  The 2010 Outreach Report shows that when ICC person-
nel held in-person meetings, they addressed community leaders, civil 
society, media, and university faculty.
149
  Ordinary members of the 
public were generally expected to learn about the ICC through print-
 
 144. Interview with Subject 963. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Kenya Accused of Hampering ICC Outreach, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING 
(Dec. 7, 2011), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/kenya-accused-hampering-icc-outreach 
[http://perma.cc/DGT9-ARVD]. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Interacting with communities, supra note 96 (showing that the ICC’s website con-
tains Outreach Reports from only 2009 and 2010). 
 149. Int’l Crim. Ct., Outreach Unit, Outreach Report 2010, at 69 (2010), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/OUR2010Eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/752C-
E43D] [hereinafter Outreach Report 2010]. 
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ed materials, radio programming,
150
 and a twelve-episode television 
show called Ask the Court.
151
 
Security concerns drove, at least in part, the ICC’s decision to 
conduct minimal in-person outreach.  The ICC’s 2010 Outreach Re-
port states that the ICC would continue to pursue direct outreach with 
“opinion leaders” but that “security issues” prevented ICC personnel 
from reaching many communities directly.
152
  The outreach plan for 
2011 referenced the possibility of running town halls, “pending secu-
rity assessment.”153 
Several interviewees who currently or formerly worked for 
the ICC conveyed that ICC personnel felt unsafe traveling within 
Kenya.  One interviewee said “everybody has an accident” in Ken-
ya.
154
  That interviewee went on to say that it did not seem that OTP 
folks were able to get anywhere within Kenya.
155
  Another interview-
ee said that investigating in Kenya was difficult because the investi-
gators were being followed.
156
  That interviewee believed that ICC 
personnel and their communications were being surveilled.
157
 
Members of the public, too, feared or were made to feel un-
safe for affiliating with the ICC.  Local news reported that individu-
als with information against the Kenyan suspects were threatened or 
killed.
158
  ICC witnesses refused to testify at trial, claiming that they 
 
 150. Id. at 72. See also Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., The ICC launches Outreach Pro-
gramme radio campaign in Kenya, (March 12, 2010), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr606&ln=fr [https://perma.cc/EXG5-YKSA] (announcing 
the ICC’s launch of its radio campaign in Kenya in March 2010 designed to inform the gen-
eral population about the ICC’s work and the Kenya cases).  
 151. Each episode would run for roughly ten minutes and would involve some number 
of ICC officials answering questions, often technical in nature.  Though the ICC has not 
published its estimated viewership for the program, most episodes available on YouTube 
have fewer than 1,000 views.  LIONEL NICHOLS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND 
THE END OF IMPUNITY IN KENYA 79 (2015); see also IntlCriminalCourt, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/user/IntlCriminalCourt/search?query=ask+the+court+kenya (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2017). 
 152. 2010 Outreach Report, supra note 149, at 78. 
 153. Id. at 108. 
 154. See Interview with Subject 101.  
 155. Id.  
 156. See Interview with Subject 102.  
 157. Id.  
 158. See, e.g., Barnabas Bii & Dennis Lubanga, Missing ‘ICC Witness’ Found Dead in 
River, DAILY NATION (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/ICC-witness-found-
dead-in-Eldoret/-/1056/2578254/-/7jbtne/-/index.html [https://perma.cc/68U2-6VA6] (re-
porting on an ICC witness found dead in a river); see also Walter Menya, Shocking: Uhuru 
‘Killed’ All Mungiki Witnesses Says ICC Prosecutor Bensouda, KENYA TODAY (Aug. 2, 
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had received threats and were worried that their families would suffer 
retaliation.
159
  Several interviewees reported that members of the 
public believed they would face physical harm if they spoke with 
ICC personnel.
160
  One interviewee intimated that the 2013 election 
exacerbated Kenyans’ concerns; Kenyatta, empowered as President, 
“could do these sorts of things” to Kenyans supporting the ICC.161  
By interfering with witnesses
162
 or failing to protect them,
163
 the 
 
2014), http://www.kenya-today.com/news/uhuru-kenyatta-killed-mungiki-witnesses-says-
icc-prosecutor-bensouda [https://perma.cc/G6E6-KYUH] (stating that the ICC prosecutor 
alleged that Kenyatta caused gang witnesses against him to be killed); Caspar Waithaka & 
John Ngirachu, Mungiki Leader Killed in Nairobi, DAILY NATION (Nov. 5, 2009), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/682504/-/4cjm1fz/-/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/JQ8V-GUGA] (stating that another gang leader was found killed on the 
same day the OTP requested permission to open an investigation into the Kenyan situation). 
 159. See Further Threats to ICC’s Kenya Witnesses, INST. WAR & PEACE REPORTING 
(Aug. 29, 2013), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/further-threats-iccs-kenya-witnesses 
[https://perma.cc/Z89P-5FC7] (referencing witnesses backing out of the Ruto/Sang trials 
because of threats and reporting on other witnesses); see also Susanne D. Mueller, Kenya 
and the International Criminal Court (ICC):  Politics, the Election and the Law, 8 J. E. AFR. 
STUD. 25, 33 (2013) (referencing a plan by the ICC defendants and their supporters “to elim-
inate, intimidate, and bribe people who knew too much about the PEV, key individuals who 
were part of it, and civil society activists who were assisting and sheltering potential wit-
nesses.”).  
 160. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 333 (stating that in some village settings people 
are afraid to speak about the ICC and also that because there have been problems with ICC 
witnesses disappearing, we may find that some people in Kenya would not want to speak 
with us about our project); Interview with Subject 444 (stating that people in some areas do 
not trust the ICC or they also believe that persons who talk to the ICC face some danger as 
being perceived as witnesses and that witnesses for the ICC have allegedly been threatened 
and killed); Interview with Subject 568 (stating that that people in Kenya really do believe 
that Kenyatta and Ruto had witnesses threatened or killed and suggesting that no rational 
witness would believe that he would be safe if he went against the president); Interview with 
Subject 582 (informing the Author to emphasize her connections with NPI-Africa and to dis-
tance herself from the ICC in future interviews, such that interviewees would know that 
speaking with her would not result in any harm or government retribution). 
 161. Interview with Subject 444 (suggesting that Kenyans believed that Kenyatta played 
a role in intimidating ICC witnesses or causing their disappearance); see also Interview with 
Subject 568 (stating that Kenyans believed Kenyatta and Ruto caused ICC witnesses to be 
threatened or killed). 
 162. In 2015, the ICC Prosecutor revealed that it had tapes of conversations indicating 
Ruto’s agents were bribing and intimidating witnesses Judie Kaberia, Prosecution Says It 
Has Evidence of Ruto ICC Witness Bribery, CAPITAL NEWS (Jun. 25, 2015), 
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2015/06/prosecution-says-it-has-evidence-of-ruto-icc-
witness-bribery/ [https://perma.cc/M6P9-XEYM]; Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-
01/11, Decision on Prosecution Request for Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony, ¶¶ 54, 
60 (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_15400.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/8S8N-58VQ].  
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Kenyan government created an atmosphere of fear and undermined 
the ICC’s access to the general public.164 
Beyond this atmosphere of fear, Kenyan cultural norms lim-
ited the ICC’s ability to conduct in-person outreach.  Outsiders are 
not easily welcomed into villages.  Without receiving approval from 
a village chief or paying meeting attendees a “sitting allowance,” 
ICC personnel would have had difficulties filling a town hall.
165
  
Kenyan leaders, perhaps unsurprisingly, did not use their power to 
encourage members of the public to meet and cooperate with the 
ICC. 
Budgetary issues, exacerbated by security concerns and ICC 
personnel’s outsider-status, restricted the ICC’s capacity to engage 
in-person outreach to ordinary citizens.  The ICC had an outreach 
budget of $910,000 (USD) for 2009.
166
  The Head of the ICC Out-
reach Section suggested that this would only permit “very limited 
outreach.”167  One interviewee, affiliated with the ICC, lamented that 
the ICC’s entire budget was “very small—less than Amnesty Interna-
tional’s.”168  The ICC did not have the funds to staff field offices or 
repeatedly send ICC personnel throughout Kenya to meet with mem-
bers of the public. 
With limited in-person outreach, the ICC was not able to cre-
ate the awareness and understanding necessary to build domestic per-
ception legitimacy. One interviewee, a civil society actor, suggested 
that the ICC’s mass media communications were ineffective because 
many Kenyans get their information “by word of mouth” or directly 
from an “ethnic lord” or community leader.169  Other civil society 
representatives complained that victims of Kenya’s post-election vio-
 
 163. See, e.g., Statement by ICC Prosecutor on the Notice to Withdraw Charges Against 
Mr. Muthaura, supra note 139; see also Statement of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, supra note 139.  
 164. The Author’s own experience in Kenya during 2015 (while the case against Ruto 
was still pending) is consistent with these reports indicating that citizens were frightened of 
being seen speaking with “the ICC.”  Some persons we contacted did not wish to speak 
about the ICC and the cases. Others were willing to speak, but only after we assured them 
that we were not in any way associated with the ICC and that we would not identify them by 
name in any publications.  
 165. See Interview with Subject 963. 
 166. See ICC Seen as Struggling to Communicate, Special Report, INST. WAR & PEACE 
REPORTING (July 14, 2009), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/icc-seen-struggling-communicate 
[https://perma.cc/D47B-CSGT]. 
 167. Id.  
 168. See Interview with Subject 103. 
 169. See Interview with Subject 444. 
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lence were unsatisfied with the ICC’s limited outreach.170  Overall, 
many victims of the post-election violence lacked sufficient infor-
mation to register as victim participants.
171
  Poor communication led 
victims to have unrealistic expectations about what the ICC could 
achieve in Kenya—resulting in victims becoming dissatisfied with 
the Court’s progress.172  It comes as no surprise that the public did 
not mobilize on behalf of the ICC when the public in “some parts of 
Kenya that bore the brunt of the violence” was “barely aware” of the 
Court.
173
 
b. Civil Society’s Pro-ICC Outreach 
The literature shows that civil society may be able to fill out-
reach gaps and hold in-person meetings to increase public awareness 
and understanding of international institutions.  Many Kenyan civil 
society organizations backed the ICC.
174
  Some even lent their 
knowledge and assistance to the ICC Prosecutor, helping to develop 
contact on the ground with victims and witnesses.
175
  However, the 
civil society organizations assisting the ICC made enemies of Ken-
yatta and Ruto, and the two fought back.  The government used its 
power to impede pro-ICC civil society organizations’ access to do-
mestic audiences. 
One government strategy involved rhetoric labeling civil so-
 
 170. The report relied on interviews with civil society representatives and other elites 
because the “security situation” made it impossible to interview victims directly.  See Thom-
as Obel Hansen, In the Shadow of Politics:  Victim Participation in the Kenyan ICC Cases, 
June 2016, Impunity Watch, at 7 (Transitional Justice Institute Research Paper No. 16–17, 
June 2016). 
 171. Id. at 30, 34 (noting that members of the public were unsure of the differences be-
tween registering as a witness and as a victim; concluding that “victims lacked information 
and were often confused about how to register and the purpose thereof.”). 
 172. Id. at 30.  
 173. Kenya Accused of Hampering ICC Outreach, supra note 146.  
 174. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 159, at 34 (stating that immediately after the ICC 
prosecutor sought permission to open the Kenya investigation in 2009, civil society activists 
in Kenya began complaining of witness intimidation); Thomas Obel Hansen and Chandra 
Lekha Sririam, Fighting for Justice (and Survival):  Kenyan Civil Society Accountability 
Strategies and Their Enemies, 9 INT’L J. OF TRANS JUST. 1, 6 (2015) (referencing a group of 
civil society organizations within Kenya that began calling for justice and accountability af-
ter the post-election violence); Simon Allison, Think Again:  Civil society in Kenya is down, 
but not out, Inst. for Security Stud. (Jan. 5, 2016), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/think-again-
civil-society-in-kenya-is-down-but-not-out [https://perma.cc/F673-6646] (referencing civil 
society’s calls for Kenya to comply with its obligations under the Rome Statute). 
 175. See Hansen and Sririam, supra note 174, at 9–10.  
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ciety organizations as pawns of foreigners.
176
  Kenyatta and Ruto ad-
vanced this rhetoric after civil society organizations brought suit, ar-
guing that the pair was precluded from running for office by the 
pending ICC charges.
177
  The defense strategy, in fact, was to blame 
the West. One interviewee explained that the two leaders argued that 
the “Western Imperialists” were behind the lawsuit to keep them 
from running for office.
178
  After successfully defeating that chal-
lenge, Kenyatta and Ruto stepped up their offensive against civil so-
ciety.  Both while campaigning and after taking office, Kenyatta and 
Ruto countered civil society’s narrative of accountability by calling 
civil society tools of western imperialism, anti-Kenyan, and even 
“evil society.”179  They used civil society as scapegoats in fighting 
their ICC cases, claiming that human rights activists in Kenya re-
ceived backing from foreign donors and thus coached ICC witnesses 
to lie.
180
 
Not unlike the interviewed ICC personnel, several civil socie-
ty organizations reported that government officials illegally entered 
 
 176. See  Kenya: Rights Defenders Under Attack, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
 (Oct. 10, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/04/kenya-rights-defenders-under-attack 
[https://perma.cc/ZL3V-MA3R]. 
 177. Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenyan Court Rejects Suit Against Presidential Candidate, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/16/world/africa/kenyan-
court-rejects-suit-against-kenyattas-candidacy.html. 
 178. Interview with Subject 444.  
 179. See Hansen and Sriram, supra note 170, at 15 (discussing the government’s coun-
ter-narrative painting the ICC and civil society organizations as tools of Western imperial-
ism); Christian M. De Vos, All roads lead to Rome: Implementation and domestic politics in 
Kenya and Uganda, in CONTESTED JUSTICE: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT INTERVENTIONS 379, 402 (Christian De Vos, Sara Kendall & Carsten 
Stahn eds., 2015) (noting that during their presidential campaign, Kenyatta and Ruto labeled 
civil society as the “evil society” for allegedly conspiring against Kenya and its people by 
supporting the ICC cases); Njonjo Mue, The ICC mustn’t give up in Kenya, OPEN 
DEMOCRACY (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/njonjo-
mue/icc-mustn%E2%80%99t-give-up-in-kenya [https://perma.cc/X2CJ-J69U] (stating that 
after Kenyatta and Ruto took office, their supporters viciously attacked civil society calling 
them “evil society” and agents of foreign powers); Allison, supra note 174(stating that the 
Kenyatta government is working to turn the public against civil society, advancing the narra-
tive that they are working to turn the public against civil society, calling the organizations 
unpatriotic because they go to the West for money and alleging that they use that money to 
support terrorist and criminal activity). 
 180. See Walter Menya, State targeting us over support for Hague cases, civil society 
protests, DAILY NATION (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Civil-
Society-ICC-Hague-Cases-Jubilee-Government/-/1064/2499628/-/kylkb4z/-/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y62Q-P9YC].  
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or bugged their offices.
181
  Government officials directly threatened, 
even in public settings,
182
 civil society representatives who were sup-
porting the ICC.  This atmosphere of government intimidation caused 
some organizations to scale back their ICC-related activities to pro-
tect themselves from their own government.
183
  One interviewee as-
serted that the government backlash had a chilling effect, and activ-
ists, “afraid,” ceased being as vocal as they once were.184 
The Kenyan government, once under Kenyatta and Ruto, used 
more than rhetoric and intimidation to silence pro-ICC civil society 
organizations.  After the 2013 election, Kenya’s Attorney-General 
proposed an amendment to the Public Benefits Organisations Act that 
would put a 15% cap on foreign funding for NGOs.
185
  The bill was 
widely criticized, both domestically and internationally.  One civil 
society representative protested that the amendment, if passed, 
“would make it hard for NGOs in the country to operate as it would 
cripple their source of funding.”186  The civil society community 
viewed the amendment as a direct response to civil society support 
for the ICC.
187
  Three separate United Nations Special Rapporteurs 
 
 181. See Hansen and Sririam, supra note 170, at 17.  
 182. See, e.g., Simon Allison, How can we better protect human rights defenders?, Inst. 
For Security Stud. (Jan. 3, 2017),  https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-can-we-better-protect-
human-rights-defenders [https://perma.cc/NJ25-FFYC] 
 183. Hansen and Sririam, supra note 170, at 17.  
 184. Interview with Subject 822. 
 185. A Bill for an Act of Parliament to Make Minor Amendments to Statute Law, No. 
32 (2013) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 146 § 123A; see also Hanibal Goitom, Kenya:  
Rejection of Bill Capping NGO Foreign Funding and Giving Spy Agency Broadened Sur-
veillance Powers, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS) (Dec. 12, 2013), 
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/kenya-rejection-of-bill-capping-ngo-foreign-
funding-and-giving-spy-agency-broadened-surveillance-powers/ [https://perma.cc/P943-
V6SE]; The Statute Law (miscellaneous Amendments) Bill, 2013:  Why It Is a Bad Law For 
the Country and Why Kenya’s Civil Society Organizations Will Resist It, NAT’L COALITION 
OF HUM. RTS.DEFENDERS (Nov. 9, 2013), http://nchrdk.org/the-statute-law-miscellaneous-
amendments-bill-2013-why-it-is-a-bad-law-for-the-country-and-why-kenyas-civil-society-
organizations-will-resist-it/ [https://perma.cc/R7A4-7WC9]; Maina Kiai, In Kenya, Averting 
a Move to Strangle Civil Society with the Financial Noose, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Dec. 18, 
2013), https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/maina-kiai/in-kenya-averting-
move-to-strangle-civil-society-with-financial-noose [https://perma.cc/EJ6Q-8RRA]; Inter-
view with Subject 58. 
 186. Kenya:  Draft Law Limits Foreign Funding for NGOs, HORN AFFAIRS (Nov. 5, 
2013), http://hornaffairs.com/2013/11/05/kenya-draft-law-limits-foreign-funding-for-ngos/ 
[https://perma.cc/TF3Z-S76U]. 
 187. Hisayo Katsui et al., Reducing Inequalities:  A Human Rights-based Approach in 
Finland’s Development Cooperation with Special Focus on Gender and  
Disability:  A Case Study on Ethiopia and Kenya 71 (2014) 
Dutton Macro Complete - Final Clean (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2017  12:47 PM 
2017] BRIDGING THE LEGITIMACY DIVIDE 109 
condemned the amendment for its “undue State interference” in civil 
society.
188
  Though the amendment was defeated,
189
 the government 
subsequently deregistered hundreds of pro-ICC civil society organi-
zations.
190
 
Because of government interference, civil society organiza-
tions were unsuccessful in their efforts to increase awareness and un-
derstanding of the Court through in-person outreach.  Civil society’s 
support for the Court led to a government backlash that threatened 
not just international criminal accountability but also basic civil and 
political rights in Kenya. 
c. Hostile Leaders’ Anti-ICC Narrative 
Kenyatta and Ruto used their proximity to the public and their 
control over local media to attack and impugn the ICC.  Taking ad-
vantage of the public’s lack of awareness of the ICC, Kenyatta, Ruto, 
and their allies depicted the ICC as a neocolonialist institution biased 
against Africa and improperly intruding on Kenyan sovereignty. 
Their narrative, which played off of Kenyan history and identity, res-
onated with the domestic audience.  Ultimately, ordinary Kenyans 
supported those charged with crimes against humanity—instead of 
the international institution trying to bring perpetrators to justice. 
The Kenyan case illustrates domestic leaders’ built-in com-
munication advantage.  Domestic leaders typically have greater ac-
cess to the domestic audience; they can hold local rallies and lever-
age their relationships with journalists and media organizations.  
 
http://www.abo.fi/fakultet/media/24259/reducinginequalitiesnetversion020414.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3WAV-FVQG]. 
 188. Kenya:  Statute Law Bill Poses Grave Threat to Civil Society and must be Reject-
ed:  UN Rights Experts, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER (Dec. 3, 2013), http://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages 
/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14055&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/4HJL-AEL4].  
 189. The Kenyan Parliament voted down the amendment, finding that it was incompati-
ble with the Constitution. Dispatches:  Kenya Stifles Media, Restricts Police Oversight, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/09/dispatches-kenya-
stifles-media-restricts-police-oversight. [https://perma.cc/3XWA-28XU]. 
 190. The government eventually suspended, but did not cancel, deregistrations.  This 
left civil society organizations wondering how long they would continue to exist. See inter-
view with Subject 582; Interview with Subject 822.  See also Allison, supra note 174 (stat-
ing that the Kenyatta government deregistered “959 NGOs for various reasons, including 
alleged misappropriation and embezzlement of donor funds, diversion of donor funds, unde-
clared foreign funding, money laundering and terrorism financing” and that the list included 
many highly respected organizations). 
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Moreover, they speak the same language as the domestic audience.  
They have the same collective memory and national identity.  Do-
mestic leaders, regardless of a State’s ethnic fractionalization, can 
fashion themselves as in-group members vis-à-vis remotely-located 
foreigners. 
i. Reaching and Rallying the Domestic Audience 
The timing of Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s “anti-ICC” messaging 
campaign reveals its instrumental nature. Kenyatta and Ruto began 
impugning the ICC once the ICC released the names of its suspects.  
In April 2011, after returning from their first appearance in The 
Hague to answer charges, Kenyatta and Ruto held a prayer rally 
where they blamed the case on politics and Western meddling.
191
  
Thousands attended.
192
  By late 2012, the two political and ethnic ri-
vals
193
 had joined together to create the Jubilee Coalition and capture 
the State’s top leadership positions.194 
The ICC featured heavily in the campaign narrative. With the 
help of a British marketing firm,
195
 Kenyatta and Ruto turned the 
ICC’s indictments into an advantage, drumming up populist support 
by painting themselves as victims of Western imperialism.
196
  Ken-
 
 191. David McKenzie, Kenyans Rally for Two Politicians  
Accused of Crimes Against Humanity, CNN (April 11, 2011), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/04/11/kenya.icc/ [https://perma.cc/QY4C-NFH3]. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Kenyatta is a leader of the Kikuyu community, while Ruto is a leader of the Kalen-
jin community.  The two communities engaged in violence against one another after the 
2007 presidential elections.  Many have documented the long history of conflict between the 
two communities.  See Thomas P. Wolf, International Justice vs. Public Opinion? The ICC 
and Ethnic Polarisation in the 2013 Kenyan Election, 12 J. OF AFR. ELECS. 143, 155–56 
(2013); Gabrielle Lynch, Electing the ‘alliance of the accused’: the success of the Jubilee 
Alliance in Kenya’s Rift Valley, 8 J. OF E. AF. STUD. 93, 96–99 (2013). 
 194. Daniel Waweru, Kenya:  The Rise of the “Uhuruto,” AFR. ARGUMENTS (Dec. 5, 
2012), http://africanarguments.org/2012/12/05/kenya-the-rise-of-the-uhuruto-by-daniel-
waweru/ [https://perma.cc/2F39-G662].  
 195. The public either did not know or did not care that Kenyatta and Ruto, who ran on 
an anti-imperialist, anti-West message, had retained a British marketing firm to develop the 
campaign message. 
 196. See CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY, SPIN DOCTORS TO THE AUTOCRATS:  HOW 
EUROPEAN FIRMS WHITEWASH REPRESSIVE REGIMES 34 (2015) (explaining the role of BTP 
Advisers in helping to craft and spread the Western imperialism message); Joseph, Did a 
British PR firm Propagate the Anti-Western Rhetoric Surrounding the ICC Cases?, NEVER 
AGAIN (March 7, 2013), https://neveragain.co.ke/did-british-pr-firm-propagate-anti-western-
rhetoric-surrounding-icc-cases/article (same) [https://perma.cc/6THH-S5AZ]; Nic 
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yatta and Ruto railed against the ICC, calling it biased against Africa 
and a tool of the neocolonialist West meant to “limit the control 
wielded by Kenya’s political elites.”197  In rallies, they asked the pub-
lic to reject Western imperialism, emphasizing that their electoral 
victory would serve as a “vote of no confidence in the ICC.”198  One 
interviewee, a journalist, explained why the media in Kenya did little 
to counter the leaders’ negative ICC rhetoric.199  The interviewee 
suggested that a combination of bribes and ad revenues led certain 
journalists to “shower[] Ruto with praise.”200  Another interviewee – 
a current or former ICC employee – shared the general sentiment that 
journalist reporting was influenced by favors and Kenyatta’s control 
and manipulation of “a lot of the media.”201 
Kenyatta also used the anti-ICC, anti-West narrative to deni-
grate Raila Odinga, his political and ethnic opponent for the presi-
dency.  In late 2012, polling numbers showed that Odinga enjoyed 
“an apparently unbridgeable lead” over Kenyatta.202  The Jubilee Co-
alition, though, turned Odinga’s support for the ICC process against 
him, claiming that Odinga was politically linked to the Court and 
backing the Court at the behest of his Western allies.
203
  The Jubilee 
Coalition highlighted that Odinga avoided ICC indictment,
204
 even 
though he had been Ruto’s political ally in the 2007 elections.205  
People Daily, a newspaper affiliated with Kenyatta, published a se-
 
Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch, & Justin Willis, Democracy and its Discontents:  Understand-
ing Kenya’s 2013 Elections, 8 J. OF E. AFR. STUD. 1, at 8 (2014) (referencing the campaign 
rhetoric painting Kenyatta and Ruto as victims of neo-colonialism). 
 197. See interview with Subject 333. See also Lynch, supra note 193, at 105 (describing 
the campaign rhetoric painting the Court as a neocolonial weapon of the West meant to pun-
ish Africa); Mueller, supra note 159, at 35 (describing the campaign rhetoric painting Ken-
yatta and Ruto as victims of Western imperialism).  
 198. Pheroze Nowrojee, The March 4 Polls and the ICC Case, LATEST KENYAN NEWS 
(Feb. 7, 2013), http://kenyauptodate.blogspot.nl/2013/02/the-march-4-polls-and-icc-
cases.html [https://perma.cc/MP9U-SFYE]. 
 199. Interview with Subject 568. 
 200. Id.  
 201. Interview with Subject 104. 
 202. Wolf, supra note 193, at 146.  See also Erich Follath, ‘Big Mama’ and the Massa-
cre:  The ICC’s Reputation in Kenya, SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 26, 2013), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/reputation-of-icc-on-the-line-in-case-against-
kenya-president-kenyatta-a-913090.html [https://perma.cc/F69K-5NKT] (stating that for 
much of the campaign, Odinga held a solid lead over Kenyatta).  
 203. See Lynch, supra note 193, at 106–107; Wolf, supra note 193, at 146. 
 204. See Lynch, supra note 193, at 105. 
 205. See Mueller, supra note 159, at 35.  
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ries of articles suggesting that Odinga, not Kenyatta, should be crim-
inally liable for the post-election crisis.
206
  Additionally, the Jubilee 
Coalition stoked a “three Os” conspiracy theory, emphasizing an al-
leged but unsubstantiated connection between Odinga, U.S. President 
Barack Obama,
207
 and the ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo.
208
  
Unlike Odinga, Kenyatta would defend Kenya’s sovereignty and in-
dependence against the patronizing and colonialist West.
209
 
ICC Prosecutor Ocampo featured in the anti-ICC narrative in 
another way:  he became the embodiment of the colonialist West. 
One interviewee stated that Kenyans viewed ICC Prosecutor Ocampo 
as “too strident.”210  That interviewee suggested that Kenyans might 
have likened Ocampo, who hails from Argentina, to the “cowboy-
like” white colonialists of Kenya’s past.211  Several interviewees ex-
pressed concern that a similar anti-ICC narrative could be employed 
in the future, across post-colonial Africa. 
Through this colonialism frame, any foreign comment de-
nouncing Kenyatta and Ruto proved their point.  In 2012, British 
Foreign Minister William Hague stated that Kenya’s international 
reputation would suffer if Kenyans elected Kenyatta and Ruto as 
their leaders.
212
  Members of Parliament allied with Kenyatta and Ru-
to were quick to denounce the remarks as evidence of Western impe-
rialism and as confirmation that “the charges against the four Ken-
yans at the ICC are being used for strategic interests.”213  In 2013, 
 
 206. Tome Francis Simiyu, Media Ownership and Framing in Kenya:  A Study of the 
ICC Case Against Uhuru Kenyatta (2013), http://www.open-science-repository.com/media-
ownership-and-framing-in-kenya-study-of-the-icc-case-against-uhuru-kenyatta.html 
[https://perma.cc/F639-RJJN] (finding that People Daily published pieces implicating 
Odinga’s criminal liability more than twice as frequently as the Nation and Standard news-
papers, which are not affiliated with either Kenyatta or Ruto). 
 207. To whom Odinga claimed to be biologically related. Odinga Says Obama Is His 
Cousin, BBC (Jan. 8, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7176683.stm 
[https://perma.cc/88FY-DEMC]. 
 208. See Lynch, supra note 193, at 106. See also Interview with Subject 582 (stating 
that Kenyatta and Ruto successfully framed Odinga as the “voice of the international [for-
eign] community”). 
 209. Lynch, supra note 193, at 106; see also T.F. Simiyu, supra note 206, Media Own-
ership (finding that People Daily, more so than the Nation and Standard newspapers, de-
scribed Kenyatta as indomitable, or “capable of putting up a spirited fight”). 
 210. Interview with Subject 338.  
 211. Id.  
 212. Simon Ndonga, Uhuru, Ruto allies critisise UK’s Hague, CAPITAL NEWS (Feb. 4, 
2012), http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2012/02/uhuru-ruto-allies-critisise-uks-hague/ 
[https://perma.cc/L7YH-MK76].  
 213. Id.  
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U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson 
said, “[T]he choice of who will lead Kenya is up to the Kenyan peo-
ple, but it is also important to note that choices have consequenc-
es.”214  The French Ambassador echoed the point and stated that 
France would be reluctant to communicate with “people who are in-
dicted by the ICC.”215 
These statements provided grist for the Jubilee mill.
216
  After 
the statements by Western officials, Kenyatta’s campaign questioned 
whether Kenyans “should allow foreign powers to dictate to them 
their choice of national leaders.”217  One person close to the Jubilee 
campaign called Carson’s statement “[a] Godsend,” since it showed 
foreign powers trying to dictate Kenya’s affairs and also made 
Odinga look “like a project of western powers.”218  A person working 
on the Jubilee campaign said that Western governments’ statements 
“had the effect of whipping up nationalism.”219 
ii. Leaders’ Communication Advantage at Work 
Kenyatta and Ruto’s anti-ICC rhetoric evidently resonated 
with the public,
220
 which otherwise had little first-hand knowledge or 
experience with the ICC.  Their ticket, itself an ethnic compromise, 
manufactured a common Western enemy.  It united rival ethnic 
 
 214. Uproar in Kenya over Johnnie Carson’s statement on Elections, JANAK 
COMMUNICATIONS UPDATES (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://janakcommunicationsupdates.blogspot.com/2013/02/uproar-in-kenya-over-us-johnnie-
carsons.html [https://perma.cc/4V6J-QFH8]. 
 215. See Steven Brown & Rosalind Raddatz, Dire Consequences or Empty Threats? 
Western Pressure for Peace, Justice and Democracy in Kenya, 8 J. OF E. AFR. STUD. 43, 51–
52 (2014). 
 216. Id. at 52. See also Interview with Subject 333. 
 217. Follath, supra note 202.  
 218. Machua Koinange, When International Criminal Court, Land Cases Became a Ma-
jor Headache for President Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, STANDARD (May 26, 2013), 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000084476/when-international-criminal-court-
land-cases-became-a-major-headache-for-president-uhuru-kenyatta-and-william-ruto 
[https://perma.cc/DE2X-J2UY].  
 219. Id.  
 220.  Interview with Subject 724 (referring to the ICC as “a big monster” that the Ken-
yan people united against to elect Kenyatta and Ruto).  See also Brown & Raddatz, supra 
note 215, at 52 (stating that Carson’s statement that was echoed by others may have driven 
“many undecided Kenyans to the polls to rally behind Kenyatta or increased voter turnout 
among Jubilee’s ethnic constituencies).  
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groups
221
 that five years earlier had been “butchering” one another.222  
For the first time in Kenyan history, the majority of ethnic Kalenjins 
voted for an ethnic Kikuyu – Kenyatta – for the presidency.223  One 
Jubilee supporter, a veteran of four violent, ethnically polarized elec-
tions, captured the public us-versus-them sentiment well:  “It’s wrong 
for anyone to come from outside, even if they are seeking truth.  It’s 
Kenyans who should judge which way it should go.  In your home, 
can anyone else come and determine your issues?  All these decisions 
should be left to Kenyan citizens.”224 
In light of Kenya’s history of “colonialism and the often hyp-
ocritical, patronizing, and unhelpful interventions of external ac-
tors,”225 it is unsurprising that anti-ICC, anti-West rhetoric resonated 
with the public.
226
  Groups that have been victimized in the past often 
preserve suffering in their collective memory, such that “victimhood 
becomes a prism through which society processes information and 
makes decisions.”227  A sense of collective victimhood results from 
traumatic experiences, including past colonial occupation,” inflicted 
wars, prolonged discrimination and exploitation, and genocide.
228
 
Collective victimhood heightens a group’s need for solidarity and 
promotes the sense that the group must protect itself from foreign ri-
vals.
229
  African leaders have successfully used references to past rac-
ism and colonialism to rally their citizenry.
230
  When politicians bring 
 
 221. See Lynch, supra note 193, at 97.  As Lynch points out, the Kikuyus are Kenya’s 
largest ethnic group with 17% of the population, while the Kalenjin constitute about 14% of 
the populace. Id. at 95.  
 222. See Is the “MIGHTY” Uhuru Propaganda machine finally CRUMBLING?, KENYA 
TODAY (Nov. 15, 2014), https://www.kenya-today.com/news/uhuru-propaganda-machine-
finally-crumbling-odm-moles-infritrating-statehouse, [https://perma.cc/7CF9-XT2L]. 
 223. See Wolf, supra note 193, at 171 (quoting Kenyatta’s speech in April 2013); 
Lynch, supra note 193, at 97–100 (reporting that the majority of Kalenjin and Kikuyu in the 
Rift Valley voted for Kenyatta in 2013).  
 224. David Smith, Kenyatta Bids for Kenyan Presidency Despite ICC ‘Crimes Against 
Humanity,’ GUARDIAN (March 3, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world 
/2013/mar/03/kenyatta-kenya-election-2013 [https://perma.cc/7YB8-8TN2]. 
 225. Lynch, supra note 193, at 106. 
 226. Id.  
 227. See  Daniel Bar-Tal, Lily Chernyak-Hai, Noa Schori, & Ayeltet Gundar, A Sense of 
Self-Perceived Collective Victimhood in Intractable Conflicts, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED 
CROSS 229, 235–6 (2009). 
 228. Id. at 237.  
 229. Id. at 245.  
 230. See James Hall, Continental Overview: African Leaders vs. The International 
Criminal Court, AFR. CONFLICT MONTHLY Monitor 6 (Dec. 2013). 
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these shared experiences to the forefront, they set the stage for citi-
zens to use their feelings of victimization to “explain away [an] in-
dictment as the result of foreign intrusion or institutional bias.”231 
Kenyatta and Ruto seized upon Kenyan collective memory 
and cultural identity to whip up resentment within their in-group 
against the out-group ICC.
232
  Indeed, Kenyatta was particularly 
well-suited to tap into Kenyans’ resentment and fear of colonialism.  
His father, Jomo Kenyatta, had led the Kenya African Union, a key 
organization in the Kenyan independence movement.  In 1952, the 
British colonial government arrested Jomo Kenyatta in an attempt to 
stall the independence movement and quell civil unrest.  African na-
tionalists across the continent called for his release.  After Kenya 
won its independence in 1961, Jomo Kenyatta was elected Kenya’s 
first Prime Minister and was subsequently elected its first Presi-
dent.
233
  Uhuru Kenyatta, like his father before him and as his name 
suggests,
234
 would take on colonialist forces, win, and ascend to the 
Presidency.  So the narrative went.
235
 
 
 231. Chaudoin & Chapman, supra note 70, at 10.  Scholars, studying attitudes towards 
the ICTY, have found that ethnic Serbs’ reported distrust of the ICTY is based on biased 
reasoning resulting from entrenched nationalistic narratives that paint the in-group as the 
victim of the ill-intentioned out-group.  See Milanovic, supra note 111, at 37-44 (referencing 
both Serb and Croat attitudes towards the ICTY); Ford, supra note 19, at 414-18 (arguing 
that the reason that most Serbs surveyed stated the ICTY was biased is because the tribunal’s 
judgments ran counter to the dominant ethnic narrative painting Serbs as victims of, inter 
alia, neo-colonialism). 
 232. See Bar-Tal et al., supra note 227, at 247 (stating that “[p]oliticians often use col-
lective victimization as a source of political power, and reminders of past and present vic-
timization are a potent theme for recruitment and mobilization.”); Milanovic, supra note 
111, at 1-3 (referencing the “continued strength of ethnic nationalist narratives” to explain 
survey findings showing that most ethnic Serbs do not believe that the findings in the ICTY 
judgments concluding that Serbs committed mass atrocities are true); Cheeseman, Lynch, & 
Willis, supra note 196, at 8 (noting that in the 1990s long-time Kenyan president Daniel arap 
Moi “expended much energy on repeated denunciations of Western interference”).  
 233. Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Kenya’s Elections:  Implications of Ethnic Rivalries and In-
ternational Intervention, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Feb. 12, 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/kenyas-elections-implications-of-ethnic-rivalries-and-
international-intervention/ [https://perma.cc/2WKV-55KQ].  According to Kimenyi, some 
commentators compared the stance of Western countries during the 2013 presidential elec-
tions in Kenya to the treatment of Jomo Kenyatta during the anti-colonialist rebellion. 
 234. “Uhuru” means “freedom” in Swahili.  
 235. This was a clear implication of Kenyatta’s inauguration speech, which made exten-
sive reference to Kenya’s colonial past and Kenyatta’s commitment to defying neocolonial-
ist forces.  FIFTH ESTATE BLOG (April 9, 2013), https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/eblog 
/2013/04/09/president-kenyattas-inauguration-speech/ [https://perma.cc/PM2A-DR8U] (“I 
acknowledge and pay tribute to the memory of my father, the late founding father of our na-
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Kenyatta and Ruto were successful in creating an anti-ICC 
narrative, which persuaded members of the public to vote across 
deeply-entrenched ethnic lines
236
 and to ignore the allegations that 
Kenyatta and Ruto had committed crimes against humanity.  Their 
success, however, speaks to the communication advantage held by 
domestic leaders rather than any established ICC bias.  Though the 
ICC has addressed nine African situations, six of these situations 
were self-referred
237
 or were referred by the Security Council with no 
dissenting votes from African States.
238
  Moreover, the ICC is cur-
rently investigating a Georgian situation and is preliminarily examin-
ing alleged crimes committed in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.
239
 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu has argued that “the number of 
Africans put on trial is an indictment of leadership and democracy in 
some African countries, not of the court.”240  Relatedly, ICC Prosecu-
tor Fatou Bensouda has argued that critics of the ICC’s caseload must 
consider that the Court, when it hears a case, strives to secure justice 
 
tion, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. May he and his fellow architects of liberation in Kenya and Afri-
ca as a whole rest in peace with the knowledge that this generation is committed to fulfilling 
their dreams of for our nation . . . The breakaway from colonialism has not been easy [but] 
The great renaissance spoken of a mere 20 years ago is upon us.”). 
 236. As suggested above, for Kenyatta to win the presidency, he needed the support of a 
substantial number of Kalenjin voters.  This meant that Kalenjins would be voting for the 
Kikuyu leader who allegedly orchestrated violence against them following the 2007 presi-
dential elections.  Even if Kalenjins voters did not believe that Kenyatta was behind the post-
election violence, a majority of Kalenjin voters had never thrown their support behind a Ki-
kuyu candidate before.  See supra note 235. 
 237. Ahmed Hassanein, Self-Referral of Situations to the International Criminal Court: 
Complementarity in Practice - Complementarity in Crisis, 17 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 107, 108–
09 (2017) (listing Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Re-
public – self-referred twice, Cote D’Ivoire, and Mali). 
 238. Id. (listing Sudan and Libya).  
 239. Preliminary Examinations, International Criminal Court, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/Preliminary-Examinations.aspx [https://perma.cc/7JPS-AZS5]; Julius 
Barigaba, ICC Is not Targeting Africa, It Is Responding to Calls from Africa, EAST AFRICAN 
(Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ICC-is-not-targeting-Africa-it-is-
responding-to-African-calls/-/2558/2661408/-/tgy33y/-/index.html [https://perma.cc/8CHX-
2GAA]. Recent empirical work also suggests that claims of anti-Africa bias are, at best, “ex-
aggerated” and that the ICC Prosecutor has focused the “gravest situations” for which the 
Court has jurisdiction. See generally Alette Smeulers, Maartje Weerdesteijn, & Barbora Ho-
la, The Selection of Situations by the ICC: An Empirically Based Evaluation of the OTP’s 
Performance, 15 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1, 38 (2015).  
 240. Desmond Tutu, Don’t Let Leaders Get Away with Murder, STAR (Oct. 11, 2013), 
http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/don’t-let-leaders-get-away-with-murder-1590432 
[https://perma.cc/FP7B-3MET]. 
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for African victims of State abuse or failure.
241
  Recent empirical 
work also suggests that the ICC Prosecutor has acted impartially and 
focused on the “gravest situations” for which the Court has jurisdic-
tion.
242
 
A great deal of evidence shows that the ICC functions fairly 
and without a clear institutional bias against Africa or Kenya, in par-
ticular.
243
  For Kenyatta and Ruto, however, the anti-ICC, anti-West 
narrative became a clever and convenient mechanism for deflecting 
attention away from their involvement in the post-election crisis.  
Their rhetoric, which inaccurately but effectively cast doubt on the 
objective legitimacy of the ICC, rendered them unassailable by 
Western States, civil society organizations with foreign ties, and cer-
tainly the remotely-located, foreign ICC. 
2. Distrust of Domestic Legal Institutions 
The public’s trust in its own legal institutions defines, as a 
baseline, the public’s trust in international legal institutions.  Though 
an international court, or its adversaries, can shift public trust through 
targeted messaging, outreach efforts cannot affect, nor are they meant 
to affect, that baseline. 
Kenyans had ample reason to distrust their judicial institu-
tions.  The Worldwide Governance Indicators Database shows that 
between 1996 and 2013, Kenya had weak rule of law and high levels 
of corruption relative to other States.  A report by Philip Alston, then 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execu-
tions, referred to the Kenyan criminal justice system as “terrible.”244 
Each element of the criminal justice system, from investigation to ju-
dicial proceedings, was described as “slow and corrupt,” giving rise 
to “impunity for criminals (particularly for those with power and 
money).”245  A Human Rights Watch report referred to Kenya’s 
 
 241. Esther Addley, Fatou Bensouda: The Woman Who Hunts Tyrants, GUARDIAN (June 
5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/jun/05/fatou-bensouda-international-
criminal-court-tyrants [https://perma.cc/D96K-BBQZ] (quoting Bensouda as stating “If cer-
tain people are looking to shield the alleged perpetrators of those crimes, of course they will 
say we are targeting [African nations]. But ... the victims deserve justice, the victims are Af-
ricans, and in the absence of the ICC nobody else is giving them justice”).  
 242. See generally Smeulers, supra note 239. 
 243. Id.  
 244. Philip Alston, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extra-
judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Mission to Kenya, May 26, 2009, at para. 23, 
16-17. 
 245. Id.  
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“decades of impunity” for political violence, noting that investiga-
tions into elections-related clashes were either suppressed or ignored 
if they reflected poorly on government officials.
246
  Not once did the 
Kenyan government prosecute, let alone convict, a high-level gov-
ernment official for inciting or engaging in political violence.
247
 
Kenyans were, in fact, distrustful of their courts.  According 
to an Afrobarometer
248
 survey conducted in 2014, only nineteen per-
cent of Kenyan respondents trusted their national courts “a lot,” 
while thirty eight percent trusted courts “somewhat.”  Another thirty 
eight percent of respondents trusted their courts “just a little” or “not 
at all.”249  Stunningly, sixty six percent of respondents believed Ken-
yan courts “always” or “often” treated people unequally.  While 
eighty six percent of respondents said that ordinary citizens “rarely” 
or “never” get away with breaking the law, only twenty percent of re-
spondents said the same about public officials.
250
 
Several interviewees expressed doubts about the fairness of 
Kenya’s courts.  One interviewee stated that “there is no record of 
justice in Kenya.”251  According to the interviewee, “even so-called 
political assassinations are not prosecuted.  Instead, the government 
creates a commission that takes the attention away from the matter; 
then the committee gets disbanded; then there is some commission 
report; then everything is dropped.”252  Another interviewee said that 
“never in Kenya has a public servant been found guilty or spent time 
in a jail cell.”  The interviewee intimated that public servants can in-
 
 246. Human Rights Watch, Ballots to Bullets:  Organized Political Violence and Ken-
ya’s Crisis of Governance (March 17, 2008), Vol. 20, No. 1(A), at 17.  
 247. Stephen Brown & Chandra Lekha Sriram, The Big Fish Won’t Fry Themselves:  
Criminal Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya, 11 AFR. AFFS. 244, 249 (2012). 
 248. Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts pub-
lic attitude surveys in various African countries. See See AFROBAROMETER, Afrobarome-
ter.org [https://perma.cc/A3K5-6EC9]. 
 249. Afrobarometer, Summary of Results Afrobarometer Round Six Survey in Kenya 
2014, 32 (2014), Compiled by:  Institute for Development Studies (IDS) 32 (Question 52J), 
http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/ken_r6_s
or_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/A96T-ZPVV]. 
 250. See Rorisang Lekalake & Stephen Buchanan-Clarke, Support for the International 
Criminal Court in Africa: Evidence from Kenya, Afrobarometer Policy Paper 1, 3 (2015), 
http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policypaper
no23_kenya_anti_corruption.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V8A-UDAT]. The findings reported in 
the policy paper were based on interviews with 2400 adult Kenyans between November and 
December 2014. Id. at 2.  
 251. See Interview with Subject 417. See also Interview with Subject 333 (stating that it 
seems like the State is not interested in justice). 
 252. Id. 
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fluence Kenyan judges and magistrates to get their cases dis-
missed.
253
 
Kenyans’ dismissiveness of their domestic legal institutions 
affected the ability of victims of the post-election violence to secure 
justice and accountability.  In February 2008, the Kenyan govern-
ment established the Waki Commission, which was chaired by a 
Kenyan judge.  The Waki Commission investigated the post-election 
violence, producing a 529-page report from which potential perpetra-
tors’ names were withheld.254  After the Kenyan government repeat-
edly failed to create a special tribunal to try potential perpetrators, the 
Waki Commission forwarded specific non-public information to the 
ICC Prosecutor.
255
  Shortly thereafter, the ICC Prosecutor opened the 
proprio motu investigation that would lead to charges against six 
suspects, including Kenyatta and Ruto.  Despite the Waki Commis-
sion’s early involvement in the ICC’s Kenya investigation, the public 
harbored doubts about the accuracy and impartiality of the charges 
before the Court. 
One survey, conducted by the Author and colleagues in 2015, 
found that roughly twice as many Jubilee voters believed that the 
ICC was biased against Africa than believed otherwise.
256
  Within the 
broader sample, 34.3% of respondents believed that the ICC was bi-
ased against Africa and 19.5% said they were neutral or unsure—but 
did not disagree that the institution might be biased.
257
  This, of 
course, says little about Kenyans’ preconceptions about the fairness 
of process afforded the ICC’s suspects, the efficiency of Court pro-
ceedings, or potential corruption of the ICC Prosecutor and judges.  
An individual who does not believe the ICC is biased against Africa 
may, and likely would, still impute the negative attributes of the 
 
 253. See Interview with Subject 568.  
 254. See WAKI COMMISSION REPORT, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE POST ELECTION 
VIOLENCE (CIPEV) 347 (2008), http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/ 
Commission_of_Inquiry_into_Post_Election_Violence.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2NX-HXA8]. 
 255. ICC Press Release, ICC Prosecutor Receives Sealed Envelope from Kofi Annan on 
Post-Election Violence in Kenya (July 9, 2009), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr436 [https://perma.cc/JP9P-P923]; ICC Press Release, ICC 
Prosecutor Receives Materials on Post-Election Violence in Kenya (July 15, 2009), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr438 [https://perma.cc/XMZ3-ZSFB]. 
 256. Five hundred and seven Kenyans from five separate regions of Kenya were select-
ed at random for the survey.  Tessa Alleblas et al. Is the International Criminal Court Biased 
Against Africans? Kenyan Victims Don’t Think So, WASH POST (March 6, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/06/is-the-international-
criminal-court-biased-against-africans-kenyan-victims-dont-think-
so/?utm_term=.ee9f6b1b0d8b [https://perma.cc/V89U-R9N7]. 
 257. Id. 
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Kenyan criminal justice system to the ICC. 
CONCLUSION 
The ICC should not be forced to rely on self-referrals and to 
pursue only those perpetrators a State’s leaders are willing to sacri-
fice.  The Court must be able to intervene over the objection of States 
whose leaders refuse to bring perpetrators of mass atrocities to jus-
tice.  The international community owes that much to victims. 
Ideally, the Assembly of States Parties and Security Council 
will take affirmative action to induce, if not coerce, compliance with 
Court arrest warrants and requests.  Third-States will remind situation 
States that the Rome Statute obligates States Parties to cooperate with 
investigations and permit ICC personnel to travel safely within their 
borders—at least for the purposes of engaging with witnesses and 
victims.  They will employ diplomatic measures to encourage situa-
tion States to comply.  Alas, the ICC’s top-down compliance mecha-
nisms have been thus far illusory and likely will continue to be so.  In 
2013, the African Union “decided” that no international tribunal 
should be permitted to try the leader of any Member State and that 
the ICC should suspend its cases against Kenyatta and Ruto.
258
  One 
interviewee for this Article lamented that “the Kenya cases were not 
really a priority for other States Parties or for the US.  In other words, 
the ICC was not getting a lot of help from other states in terms of 
forcing Kenya to cooperate with the ICC.”259 
Unless the Assembly of States Parties or the Security Council 
takes decisive steps in response to the Court’s future findings of State 
noncompliance, the ICC will have to rely on bottom-up compliance.  
For the ICC to succeed in its goal of bringing justice to victims of 
mass atrocities, the ICC and the international community must work 
together to find ways to enhance and protect the ICC’s domestic per-
ception legitimacy.  Kenya is not the only State in which anti-ICC 
rhetoric could be deployed.  For the same reasons that Kenyatta and 
 
 258. ICC Press Release, supra note 255; ICC Press Release, ICC Prosecutor Receives 
Materials on Post-Election Violence in Kenya (July 15, 2009), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr438 [https://perma.cc/XMZ3-ZSFB]. 
 259. See Interview with Subject 102. Brown and Raddatz make a similar point about the 
world’s waning support for the Kenya cases.  They note that although some Western leaders 
threatened consequences if Kenyatta and Ruto took office, follow-through seemed lacking.  
They explain that Western countries initially snubbed Kenyatta by not congratulating him on 
becoming president.  Afterwards, it was “business as usual,” with governments’ issuing 
cryptic warnings about cooperating with the ICC, but not implementing any sanctions, such 
as withdrawing aid. Brown & Raddatz, supra note 215, at 52-53. 
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Ruto’s rhetoric resonated with Kenyans, similar rhetoric could reso-
nate in other post-colonial States with weak domestic legal institu-
tions. 
How can the ICC avoid the same fate it suffered in the Kenya 
cases and achieve domestic perception legitimacy when it intervenes 
over a State’s objection?  The evidence from the Kenya case study 
convinces this Author that bridging the legitimacy divide in such cas-
es will require funding, ICC prioritization of in-person outreach, en-
gagement from civil society organizations, advancement of rule of 
law, and time. 
First, the States Parties must provide the ICC with sufficient 
funding to allow ICC personnel to conduct in-person outreach with 
domestic audiences in situation States.  Even if in-person outreach is 
costly, and the ICC has to retain a security staff, outreach is critical.  
The ICC must also prioritize conducting its own in-person outreach, 
at least when the ICC intervenes over a State’s objection and civil so-
ciety actors face a hostile environment.  The Kenya case study is a 
lesson in what can happen when in-person engagement is lacking or 
minimal.  Domestic leaders, because of their communication ad-
vantages in the situation State, can mobilize the public against the 
ICC if the ICC fails to raise awareness and understanding. 
Second, civil society organizations must act as norm entre-
preneurs in and around situation States; they must support compli-
ance with the ICC and advance norms of international criminal jus-
tice and accountability.
260
  Civil society organizations, when 
permitted to operate, have similar communication advantages as have 
domestic leaders.  Acting in-State, civil society organizations can 
host local events and build local coalitions.  Moreover, they can take 
advantage of their shared national identity and cultural touchstones to 
message to the public.  Though the Kenya case shows that civil so-
ciety organizations will not always be able to function in situation 
States, their role in building the ICC’s domestic perception legitima-
cy is not so geographically limited.  It is important that civil society 
organizations target third-States, in addition to situation States, to 
create a critical mass and facilitate an ultimate “cascade” of support 
 
 260. Norms spread with the help of agents, often referred to as “norm entrepreneurs” or 
“transnational moral entrepreneurs,” who use persuasion to convince a community to adopt 
the preferred behavior.  See generally Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International 
Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 895-897 (1998) (explaining 
norm influence and norm entrepreneurs).  See also Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey In-
ternational Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2656 (1997) (referring to the role of transnational 
moral entrepreneurs). 
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for the ICC.
261
  Norms of compliance will spread more quickly if the 
ICC does not have to work alone. 
Third, international actors must continue supporting global 
rule of law and domestic capacity-building initiatives.  This is a task 
primarily for States, international political institutions rather than in-
ternational judicial institutions, and civil society organizations.  The 
ICC’s much-lauded involvement in the Colombian peace process262 
may suggest a role for the ICC in domestic capacity-building.
263
  
That role would be limited, however, to the Court assisting States to 
prosecute atrocities in their domestic courts—which may have ancil-
lary but lasting effects on rule of law. 
Fourth and finally, all of this would take time.  If the relevant 
actors commit to building the Court’s domestic perception legitima-
cy, domestic audiences will eventually trust the ICC and adopt the 
norms of international criminal justice and accountability as their 
own.  Someday the public, “[d]etermined to put an end to impunity” 
and “[r]esolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement 
of international justice,”264 will induce the compliance of situation 
States, even if the Assembly of States Parties and the Security Coun-
cil will not. 
 
 
 261. A cascade presumably would result from a combination of top-down and bottom-
up compliance mechanisms, i.e. a combination of a State’s international, strategic interests 
and its responsiveness to public mobilization.  See, e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink, supra note 
260, at 895.  
 262. Ainley, see supra note 16 
 263. This role has been referred to as “positive” or “proactive” complementarity. For an 
argument against positive complementarity, see Christine Bjork & Juanita Goebertus, Com-
plementarity in Action:  The Role of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening 
in Kenya, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. J. 205, 213 (2014).  For a view in favor, see generally 
William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity:  The International Criminal Court 
and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 
(2008). 
 264. Rome Statute, supra note 1, Preamble. 
